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PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN PENNSYLVANIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Actions by consumers to recover damages for personal injury or
property loss due to defective products represents a field of law marked
by rapid development in both the courts and legislatures of the states.
Pennsylvania typifies this continuing evolution. The purpose of the present
discussion is to provide the Pennsylvania practioner with a compilation
of the pertinent decisions of Pennsylvania courts in the area of products
liability. Recent commentary by scholars and jurists is similarly collected
and analyzed in order to provide insight into academic thought on the
subject. Since decisions in other jurisdictions are often indicative of
trends which may become the law in Pennsylvania, they are also included
within the scope of this discussion.
The ensuing analysis initially examines the negligence theory of
liability. Under the rule originally enunciated in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.' and later adopted in Pennsylvania, 2 the requirement of privity
in tort actions is abandoned and the potential liability of a manufacturer
to a consumer for negligence is established. Because of the great impact
of MacPherson on the field of products liability, the scope of that case's
rule in Pennsylvania is scrutinized in detail. The analysis focuses on the
Restatement of Torts on which much of Pennsylvania negligence law is
based, and includes an in-depth study of the duties of care imposed upon
manufacturers, middlemen, and retailers as well as the defenses available
to such parties. The discussion will then focus on the action in assumpsit
for breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code which
Pennsylvania adopted in 1953. 3 The Code's provisions on warranties, both
express and implied, and disclaimers to them are examined in connection with earlier decisions under the Sales Act.4 Related problems of
notice and privity are likewise analyzed in order to present a complete
exposition of Pennsylvania's law in this growing sector of products
liability. Finally the ramifications of the theory of strict liability in tort
are examined in light of Pennsylvania's recent adoption of section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in Webb v. Zern.' This final section
provides the practioner with indications of where, how, and against whom
such liability arises and presents the attendant defenses.
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

2.
3.
4.
5.

See note 20 infra.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (Supp. 1967).
Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Pa. Laws 543 (repealed 1953).
422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), noted in 12 VILL. L. REv. 204 (1966).
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THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEGLIGENCE

A.

Introduction and History

To protect the consumer from the latent dangers found in products
which inundate the marketplace, the law imposes on manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers a duty to exercise a degree of care commensurate with
their status in the distributive chain. A plaintiff who seeks redress for a
product-caused injury by suing in negligence must establish: that the
defendant was under a duty to exercise due care to prevent harm to the
plaintiff or damage to his property; that the defendant breached that
obligation by conduct falling below the standard required of a reasonably
prudent man in the same or similar circumstances; and that the defendant's
conduct was a proximate cause of the injury. The defenses of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse of the product are available
to insulate the defendant from liability. It is the purpose of this section of
the Comment to consider the history of the negligence action in Pennsylvania, the particular problems it raises, and the resolution of those problems under existing Pennsylvania law.
The common law was hesitant to impose duties of care on manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers because of a desire to foster industrial
growth and, therefore, a general rule was molded which precluded a cause
of action in negligence where privity of contract was absent. The genesis
of this rule was the misinterpretation of Lord Abinger's dictum in the
case of Winterbottom v. Wright6 wherein he stated:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the
road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a
similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as
this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and
7 outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit would ensue.
The foundation upon which the barrier of privity was erected in Pennsylvania was the case of Curtin v. Somerset" wherein the court recognized
6. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). Winterbottom involved an action
for personal injuries by a plaintiff, not in privity of contract with the defendant, for
breach of a contract to repair. The court's denial of recovery on the basis of lack of
privity is unassailable to this day because the plaintiff brought his action in contract.
See F. BOHLEN, ST'rUoIS IN THE LAW Or TORTs 76 (1926) ; Fricke, Personal Injury
Damages in Products Liability, 6 VILL. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1960).
7. 10 M. & W. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842).
8. 140 Pa. 70, 21 A. 244 (1891). In Curtin the plaintiff, a guest in a hotel,
brought suit in negligence against the hotel builder for injuries sustained when the
porch on which plaintiff was standing collapsed. The court, in denying recovery for
want of privity, distinguished two earlier cases, Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. 387, 59 Am.
Dec. 731 (1853) and Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. 111, 67 Am. Dec. 404 (1856), which
had granted recovery on similar facts without discussing privity of contract. In
Hagerty the employee of the lessee of a building was allowed to recover against the
defendant builder and lessor, and in Carson the very same defendant was held liable

to a sublessee. Both cases were distinguished
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10

also the owner and lessor.

on the grounds that the builder was
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the rule of Winterbottom.9 The rule of Curtin was soon embedded in the
law of Pennsylvania' ° and persisted until 1931.11 In light of the economic
and social environment of the times, the inception and perpetuation of the
Winterbottom-Curtin rule is understandable. Several factors had coalesced
to justify limiting responsibility for defects in products within the bounds
of privity of contract: industry was in an embryonic stage of development,
marketing techniques lacked sophistication, and products were simple in
construction and design. 12 The courts, cognizant of these factors, gave
effect to the prevailing desire to encourage industrial growth.
The intrinsic injustice of the rule in certain situations, however,
induced the courts to develop exceptions. The forerunner of the exceptions
was Thomas v. Winchester,"3 where the court eliminated the requirement
of privity if the product could be classified as inherently dangerous.
Pennsylvania adopted the principle of this case initially in Elkins, Bly &
Co. v. McKean, 14 and subsequently in Curtin v. Somerset." A second
exception, followed by Pennsylvania in Catani v. Swift & Co.,", fixed
liability on manufacturers for negligent preparation of food products.
Absent the application of these two exceptions, however, Pennsylvania
rigidly adhered to a rule of non-liability in cases where privity was absent.
The historic polestar in the area of products liability and the cause
of action in negligence is Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in MacPhersonv.
Buick Motor Co. 7 In MacPhersonthe plaintiff brought an action in negligence against the manufacturer for injuries sustained when the plaintiff's
automobile, purchased from a retail dealer, suddenly collapsed as a result
of a defective wheel. Justice Cardozo eliminated the defense of privity,
thereby imposing on manufacturers an affirmative duty to exercise care
9. It is interesting to note at this point two matters of historical interest. First,
the requirement of privity developed in Pennsylvania in' situations where a plaintiff
sought recovery for damages incurred as a result of a defendant's negligence in the
construction of a building, not for negligence in the manufacture or handling of a
product. Although no Pennsylvania cases have been found denying recovery for lack
of privity where a defective product was involved, the express language of Curtin
indicates that negligent manufacture was within the purview of its rule. Second, the
J'interbottom rule is often stated in Pennsylvania not only in terms of a lack of
duty to the plaintiff with whom there is no privity, but also in terms of causation.
In Curtin, for example, the court stated that relinquishment of possession by the
builder to the owner broke the causative chain between defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's injury.
10. Curtin was followed in Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R., 201 Pa. 131, 50 A. 829
(1902); First Presbyterian Congregation v. Smith, 163 Pa. 561, 30 A. 279 (1894);
Fitzmaurice v. Fabian, 147 Pa. 199, 23 A. 444 (1892) ; Stubbs v. Duquesne Light Co.,
84 Pa. Super. 1 (1924).
11. Curtin was effectively overruled in Grodstein v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154
A. 794 (1931). See p. 808 infra.
12. See L. FRUMMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY § 5.01 (1967).
13. 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
14. 79 Pa. 493 (1875). In Elkins the court reversed a judgment for a manufacturer of oil in an action by a remote purchaser for injuries resulting from an explosion.
15. 140 Pa. 70, 80, 21 A. 244, 245 (1891). In Curtin the exception was approved
but held inapplicable.
16. 251 Pa. 52, 95 A. 931 (1915). The court in Catani expressly rejected the
argument of the defendant meatpacker that lack of privity with the ultimate consumer, who died as the result of diseased meat, obviated the existence of a duty of care.
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
17. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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in the fabrication of products which, though harmless in themselves, become dangerous when negligently made. In the words of the eminent
jurist :
If the nature of the thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a
thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be
expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that
the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used
without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer
of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully ...
* . .

In such circumstances, the presence of a known danger,

attendant upon a known use, makes vigilance a duty. We have put
aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract
and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where
it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.
* . .

Yet the defendant [manufacturer] would have us say that

he [the retail dealer] was the one person whom it was under a legal
duty to protect. The law does not lead us to so inconsequent a conclusion. Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach do
not fit the conditions of travel to-day. The principle that the danger
must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing
civilization require them to be.' 8
The opinion recognized that the then existing status of industrial growth
justified, and future progress would demand, abrogation of the privity
20
defense. The MacPherson rule1 9 has been adopted in Pennsylvania,
as it has been in all other jurisdictions. Although some courts have misapplied the rule with hair-splitting distinctions and have rendered decisions
18. Id. at 389-91, 111 N.E. at 1053.
19. RPSTATrEMENT (SPcoND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965) states the MacPherson rule
as follows:
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a
chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to those who use it for a purpose for
which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those whom he should
expect to be endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which
it is supplied.
20. See Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958),
modified, 271 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying Pennsylvania law); Mannsz v.
Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) ; Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem.
Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co.,
216 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888
(E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Magee v.
General Motors Corp., 117 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1953), rev'd on other grounds.
213 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1954); Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199,
199 A.2d 875 (1964) ; Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961) ;
Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949) ; Bollin v. Elevator
Constr. & Repair Co., 361 Pa. 7, 63 A.2d 19 (1949) ; Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352
Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945) ; Henderson v. National Drug Co., 343 Pa. 601, 23 A.2d
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
743 (1942) ; Ebbert v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938);
Mattiuci v. C.F. Simonin's Sons, 40 Pa. D. & C. 535 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1941).
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frought with inconsistencies and confusion, 2 1 Pennsylvania has recognized
the true import of MacPherson and has achieved results consistent with
its rationale.

22

B.

The Scope of MacPherson

In MacPherson a remote purchaser was granted recovery for personal injuries against the manufacturer of a completed product on the
ground that the manufacturer failed to exercise due care in the fabrication of his product. Under the law of Pennsylvania, the MacPherson
rationale has been extended to afford protection to plaintiffs other than
purchasers who lack privity of contract, to impose liability on all parties
in the manufacturing and marketing chain, and to include recovery for
property damage as well as for personal injury.
Numerous cases in Pennsylvania have applied MacPherson to nonpurchasing plaintiffs, 23 and the question of whether a duty of care is owed
to such plaintiffs is resolved by employing a foreseeability test. If the
defendant could reasonably foresee that a class of persons of which the
plaintiff was a member would be endangered by the risk created, then
24
the defendant owes an obligation to the plaintiff to avoid its creation.
25
Illustrative of this principle is Scurfield v. Federal Laboratories, Inc.,
wherein the defendant manufacturer sold a tear gas gun resembling a
fountain pen to a florist. The plaintiff, a business invitee in the florist's
shop, picked up the "pen" from beside the cash register and, while
examining it, unaware of the danger, accidentally discharged it into his
face causing permanent injury. The court affirmed a dismissal of the
action for failure to state a cause of action, holding that the defendant
manufacturer owed no duty to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous
nature of the pen because the defendant could not have reasonably anticipated that such a plaintiff would be endangered by its use. While the
decision of the court may be criticized, first because the question of foreseeability is, in most cases, within the province of the jury, and secondly,
because it is likely that the manufacturer could foresee a risk of harm
to the florist's customers, 26 Scurfield nevertheless is an example of the
application of the foreseeability test as the measure for determining the
beneficiaries of a manufacturer's duties.
21. See 24 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 204 (1955) for the havoc wrought in New York,
MacPherson's home jurisdiction.
22. In Ebbert v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 232 (1938), the first
Pennsylvania case applying MacPherson, the court refused to accept defendant's argument that the product causing harm must be inherently dangerous before a duty of
care arises. The court said, '[A]s modern mechanisms multiply, the futility of invoking this phrase . . . [inherently dangerous] in the adjudication of cases becomes
increasingly apparent." Id. at 262, 198 A. at 326.
23. See, e.g., Hopkins v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir.
1952) ; Montesano v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 213 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Pa. 1962);
Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 395 (1965) quoted in note 19 supra.
25. 335 Pa. 145, 6 A.2d 559 (1939).
26. See Scurfield v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 335 Pa. 145, 152-53, 6 A.2d 559,
Published
by Villanova
University
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
562-63 (1939)
(dissenting
opinion).
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The rule and rationale of MacPherson warrants abrogation of the
requirement of privity not only with respect to manufacturers of completed products, but also with respect to manufacturers of component
parts, assemblers, wholesalers, and retailers whose negligence causes
injury to foreseeable plaintiffs. 27 Pennsylvania has made such reasonable
extensions of MacPhersonand, as a general statement, it may be said that:
The substantive law of Pennsylvania supports the view that
where a person is injured through the use of a chattel ...

such person

is not limited in his right to recover for injuries sustained to the
manufacturer but may point his cause of action against either the
manufacturer, distributor or retailer, and liability is several. 2
A further extension of MacPhersonhas granted recovery to a plaintiff
for damage to his property, notwithstanding the absence of personal
injury. This issue arose for the first time in Pennsylvania in Mattiucci v.
C. F. Simonin's Sons. 29 In this case the court rejected the defendant's
argument that MacPherson applied solely to personal injuries, and permitted the plaintiff manufacturer of mayonnaise to recover against the
defendant manufacturer of oil for spoilation of the mayonnaise due to
foreign substances in the oil.30
C. The Duty of Due Care
1.

The Manufacturer

The manufacturer of a product is obligated to foreseeable plaintiffs
to exercise due care in three specific respects: he must carefully fabricate
his product, safely design it, and adequately warn consumers of dangers
that may arise from its use. Resolution of the question of whether a duty
should be imposed in a particular case should depend on the delicate
balance between the degree of risk created and the social utility of the
product.
Section 395 of the Restatement,31 which states the rule of MacPherson, imposes on manufacturers the duty to construct their products carefully, and the comments appended to that section particularize the matters
27. In Miller v. Meadville Food Serv., Inc., 173 Pa. Super. 357, 98 A.2d 452
(1953), the court upheld a suit in negligence against both the maker of a pie and
the manufacturer of the pie filling, and in Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261
F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958) (applying Pennsylvania law), the defendant assembler of an
automobile was held liable for his negligence. Similarly, in Topelski v. Universal
South Side Autos, Inc., 407 Pa. 339, 180 A.2d 414 (1962), the retail dealer of an auto
was held liable to the plaintiff who was injured in an accident with the purchaser of
the automobile.
28. Fleming v. John Deere Plow Co., 158 F. Supp. 399, 400 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
29. 40 Pa. D. & C. 535 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1941).
30. Accord, Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53
(E.D. Pa. 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
31.

See note 19 supra.
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in which manufacturers are required to use due care. In addition to
approving the Restatement's expression of the rule, 32 Pennsylvania has
adopted the comments as an accurate explication of the manufacturer's
duties. 33 Reasonable care in the construction of a product requires that
the manufacturer: (1) make "such inspections and tests during the course
of manufacture and after the article is completed as the manufacturer
should recognize as reasonably necessary to secure the production of a
safe article . . .;-134 (2) select carefully "material and parts to be incorporated in the finished article . . .;"35 (3) ensure careful "fabrication
of the article by every member of the operative staff no matter how high
or low his position . . .;,"6 (4) pack "the article so as to be safe for
'37
those who must be expected to unpack it."
32. See, e.g., Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) ; Solomon v.
White Motor Co., 153 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Pa. 1957) ; Wissman v. General Tire Co.,
327 Pa. 215, 192 A. 633 (1937).
33. In Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949), the
court quoted extensively from the comments. Although the court in Foley was applying Ohio law, the opinion reviews Pennsylvania law in the area of negligence and
products liability, and has been given great weight in subsequent Pennsylvania cases.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op' TORTS § 395, comment f at 328 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT, comment f].
In Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949), the
court found the defendant manufacturer negligent because he failed to test and inspect
the raw materials he used to construct a tank in order to discover latent defects in
them. Accord, Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958),
modified, 271 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying Pennsylvania law). In Newcomb v.
Armour & Co., 39 F. Supp. 716 (M.D. Pa. 1941), the court stated that the manufacturer of food products owes to consumers the duty of reasonable inspection of his
commodity before marketing it for consumption. However, in Tavani v. Swift & Co.,
262 Pa. 184, 105 A. 55 (1918), the court refused to hold the defendant liable for
negligence for failing to discover trichinae in meat since no effective test existed by
which such a discovery was possible.
35. RYSTATEMVNT, comment f. See Foley note 34 supra. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) ov TORTS § 395, comment g at 328-29 (1965).
36. RESTATEMENT, comment f.
The question of negligent fabrication arises most often in cases where the
plaintiff has been injured by consumption of a defendant's food product. The Pennsylvania courts often state as a general rule that "[t]hose engaging in the business of
manufacturing or compounding food or beverages for consumption must use a high
degree of care to see that the food or beverage is free from foreign or deleterious
substances that injuriously affect the user." Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 116, 145 A. 700 (1929) ; accord, Newcomb v. Armour &
Co., 39 F. Supp. 716 (M.D. Pa. 1941); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co.,
345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942) ; Miller v. Meadville Food Serv., Inc., 173 Pa. Super.
357, 98 A.2d 452 (1953); Smith v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 152 Pa. Super. 445,
33 A.2d 488 (1943); Menaker v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. Super. 76,
189 A. 714 (1937) ; Madden v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 106 Pa. Super. 474, 162
A. 687 (1932) ; Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537
(1931) ;Murphy v. Yuengling Dairy Prods. Corp., 34 Pa. D. & C. 355 (C.P. Schuylkill
County 1938).
In Magee v. General Motors Corp., 117 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1953), rev'd
on other grounds, 213 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1954) and Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co.,
211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.
1963), the defendant manufacturers were held liable for defectively constructing
driving apparatuses.
37. RESTATEMENT, comment f.
In the exploding bottle cases, the manufacturer may have been negligent in
the packing of the item. See, e.g., Braccia v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 398 Pa. 386,
157 A.2d
747 (1960);
LochCharles
v. Confair,
Pa.of212,
A.2d
451 (1953)
Published
by Villanova
University
Widger372
School
Law 93
Digital
Repository,
1968; Dillon v.
William S. Scull Co., 164 Pa. Super. 365, 64 A.2d 525 (1949).

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1968], Art. 10

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13

Although the manufacturer may construct his article perfectly, its
design may create a risk of harm to foreseeable plaintiffs. Pennsylvania
has likewise adopted the Restatement's expression of this rule :3
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes
it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to
liability to others whom he should expect to use the chattel or to be
endangered by its probable use for physical harm caused by his
failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan
or design.a9
In the cases that have arisen in Pennsylvania, negligent design has been
recognized as the basis of liability in suits brought against the manufacturer of an airplane,4 0 a meat grinder, 41 a scaffolding bracket,4 2 and a

gas tank.

48

A manufacturer may also be subject to liability for
foreseeable plaintiffs of the danger involved in the use
A plaintiff who predicates his cause of action on such
must prove that a duty to warn existed and, if a warning

failing to warn
of his product.
failure to warn
was given, that

it was inadequate.
A combination of the following three elements raises the duty of a
manufacturer to warn:
(1)

the product must involve danger in its use;

(2)

the danger must be latent; and

(3)

the manufacturer must have actual or constructive knowledge
of the danger.

44

38. See Montesano v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 213 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Pa. 1962)
Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 398 (1965).
40. Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358

U.S. 910 (1958).
41. Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1962).
42. Montesano v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 213 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
43. Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949). See

generally Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturersfor Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1956) ; Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or
Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
44. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 388 (1965) states the rule as follows:

One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use
is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel
with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical
harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person
for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied
will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition
or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
Or TORTS § 394 (1965) specifically applies section 388 to
manufacturers. Section 388 has been adopted in Pennsylvania in numerous cases. See,
e.g., Pritchard
295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961);
Pa. 1963) ; Foley v. PittsburghDes Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).

v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
McMeekin v. Gimbel Bros., 223 F. Supp. 896 (W.D.
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Where a product is defective and injury ensues, the requirement that
the product be dangerous to use is often easily met. Even without a defect,
however, the nature of a product may require a warning. In McMcekin
v. Gimbel Bros.,45 the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a
warning in the use of a lawnmower because he failed to prove that a
lawnmower is a dangerous instrumentality. Where the product is dynamite, the requisite danger is apparent. The obviousness of the danger,
however, raises a further problem because of the requirement that the
danger be latent. In Hopkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 40

this exact issue was presented to the court when the husband of the
plaintiff was killed by a discharge of dynamite placed in a freshly drilled
hole while a drill was being operated a few feet away. The court held
that the general danger inherent in dynamite does not obviate the necessity
to warn of the specific danger of placing dynamite in the heat of a freshly
drilled hole and in proximity to the vibrations of an operating drill. 47

The requirement that the manufacturer have actual or constructive
knowledge of the danger usually presents the question whether the manufacturer should have made tests to discover the existence of danger in
the use of his product or, if he has made tests, whether those tests were
48
adequate.
If the duty to warn exists, then the manufacturer must exercise
reasonable care to properly warn potential users of any known danger.
Failure to give a warning is negligent conduct as a matter of law. 49
In cases where some warning has been given, the adequacy of the warning
becomes the material issue. In evaluating the adequacy of the warning
courts should recognize a manufacturer's natural reluctance to warn or
to display such warnings conspicuously since he is generally attempting to
promote the sale of his product. 50
45. 223 F. Supp. 986 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
46. 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952).
47. The Hopkins case was on appeal from the trial court's decision to grant the
defendant's motion to dismiss. The circuit court reversed, holding that the plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to go to the jury. Plaintiff's victory in the new trial gave
rise to a second appeal. 212 F.2d 623 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954).

The court, taking a different approach, reversed the plaintiff's judgment holding that
he failed to present sufficient evidence to go to the jury.
48. In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961),
the plaintiff brought an action premised on negligence and breach of warranty, alleging
that he had contracted lung cancer from the use of defendant's cigarettes and that the
defendant should have warned him of the danger. The court held, inter alia, that a
dismissal of the cause of action in negligence was improper because the question
whether defendant should have conducted different or additional tests was for the jury.
Furthermore, where the tests reveal the danger, failure to warn is negligence.
In DeVito v. United Airlines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951) (applying Pennsylvania law), the court held that since the defendant plane manufacturer discovered,
by testing, the possibility of carbon monoxide buildup in the cockpit, he should have
warned the carrier of the danger.
49. See De Vito v. United Airlines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951) (applying Pennsylvania law).
50. See Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions For Use and the Duty
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of Law Digital
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The question of adequacy is two-pronged: first, have the appropriate
persons been warned, and second, was the warning sufficient to instill in
consumers knowledge of the danger? The resolution of the first question
involves the application of the test of foreseeability: the manufacturer
owes a duty to warn those whom he "should expect to use the chattel ...
or to be endangered by its probable use. .. ."1 When a purchaser's employee is injured in using a manufactured product the issue arises
whether a warning to the plaintiff's employer adequately discharges the
manufacturer's duty. The Restatement resolves the question in the following manner:
Giving to the third person through whom the chattel is supplied
all the information necessary to its safe use is not in all cases sufficient to relieve the supplier from liability .... The question remains
whether this method gives reasonable assurance that the information
will reach those whose safety depends upon their having it.12
The problem of whether the warning is sufficient to put consumers
on notice of the danger presents a difficult factual question, hence it is
best illustrated by an analysis of the cases that have discussed the point.
In Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co.,5 3 the plaintiff's wife died from the inhalation
of carbon tetrachloride fumes present in the defendant's cleaning fluid.
There was a warning on the container, in one-quarter and one-eighth inch
lettering, cautioning users not to inhale the lethal fumes. On the other
hand, the words "Safety-Kleen" appeared four times on the can, either in
one-half or three-quarters inch lettering. In holding the warning to be
inadequate, the court emphasized that a busy housewife could easily
be lulled into a false sense of security by the conspicuous presence of the
words "Safety-Kleen." Similarly, in Hopkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours
& Co.,5 4 the court held a list of 63 warnings in the use of dynamite inadequate because none of the admonitions given covered the specific danger
causing the explosion which injured the plaintiff. The Maize-Hopkins
analysis imposes on the manufacturer a stringent duty of care in the
presentation of his warnings, but the imposition is justified by the high
degree of danger.
Another factor to consider in determining the effectiveness of a warning is the practicality of the method adopted by the manufacturer to convey
knowledge of the danger. In Oetthiger v. Norton Co., 55 the plaintiff's eye
was injured when a piece of the spindle of a mounted abrasive point
51. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 388 (1965). See Scurfield v. Federal
Laboratories, Inc., 335 Pa. 145, 6 A.2d 559 (1939), discussed at p.797 supra.
52. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op TORTS § 388, comment n at 308 (1965) ; accord,
Brandon v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 220 F. Supp. 855, 859-60 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
53. 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945).
54. 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952). This isthe dynamite case discussed at pp. 800-01
supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
55. 160 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 253 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1958).
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severed due to the excessive speed at which it was operated. The issue
was whether the defendant had adequately discharged his duty to warn
by distributing pamphlets which contained information on the proper
speeds at which to operate such abrasive points, or whether the defendant
had an obligation to go further and also make appropriate warnings
either on the point itself or on the container in which it was packaged.
The court held that plaintiff's experience as a workman as well as his
knowledge of the availability of instructional pamphlets amounted to
contributory negligence. In so holding, the court accepted the defendant's
argument that any method of warning other than the distribution of informative pamphlets would have been impractical.
A special problem arises in duty to warn cases when the plaintiff's
injury is the result of an allergic reaction to a component of the defendant's product. No Pennsylvania cases have been found wherein the plaintiff based his cause of action in negligence for an allergy-caused injury.
In Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., 56 the plaintiff brought a breach of warranty
action for injuries caused by an allergy to the material of a dress. The
court reasoned that such liability could be imposed in allergy cases only
where there is a definite class of allergics able to be foreseen and warned
by the manufacturer. But, where the plaintiff's allergy is peculiar to him,
as in Barrett, there is no breach of warranty. Similar reasoning is applic57
able to duty to warn cases.

56. 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941).
57. See Fricke, Personal Injury Damages in Products Liability, 6 VILL. L. Rgv. 1
(1960); Noel, The Duty to Warn Allergic Users of Products, 12 VAND. L. REv.

331 (1959).
The Restatement imposes liability on manufacturers in three other situations
which infrequently arise. In Labick v. Vicker, 200 Pa. Super. 111. 186 A.2d 874 (1962),
the court based defendant's liability in part on section 389 which reads as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another's use,
knowing or having reason to know that the chattel is unlikely to be made reasonably safe before being put to a use which the supplier should expect it to be
put, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by such use to those whom
the supplier should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable
use, and who are ignorant of the dangerous character of the chattel or whose
knowledge thereof does not make them contributorily negligent, although the
supplier has informed the other for whose use the chattel is supplied of its dangerous character.
No Pennsylvania cases have been found calling for the application of sections 390
and 397 of the Restatement. Section 390 reads as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because
of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should
expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical
harm resulting to them.
Under section 397:
A manufacturer of a chattel which is compounded under a secret formula or
under a formula which although disclosed should be recognized as unlikely to
be understood by those whom he should expect to use it lawfully, is subject to
liability for physical harm caused to them and persons whom he should expect
to be endangered by its probable use by his failure to exercise reasonable care
to adopt such a formula and to bring to the knowledge of those who are to
useby the
chattel
such directions
as will
make
it reasonably
safe for
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2.

Middlemen and Retailers

Middlemen and retailers are ordinarily conduits of products manufactured by another, but may, in some circumstances, be held to the same
duties as manufacturers. The plaintiff has two avenues of approach to
impose such liability. First, he may attempt to invoke section 400 of the
Restatement, adopted by Pennsylvania in Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp. :58 "One
who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is
subject to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer."5 9 This
section is based on the economic fact that consumers rely on the brand
names and trademarks of products, and consequently the sponsors of the
products must assure them of quality. 60 In this connection it should be
pointed out that dictum in Forry indicates that absence of reliance on the
brand name or trademark of the defendant is a defense;61 the basic
theory of section 400 seems to support this conclusion. 62 The second
approach may be taken where the manufacturer distributes or retails his
product through a subsidiary corporation. Here the plaintiff may have an
opportunity to impose manufacturer's liability by piercing the corporate
veil. 65
Wholesalers and retailers may, of course, be liable for their own
failure to exercise due care in their handling of a product. For example,
where the defendant carelessly stores or transports an item the plaintiff
may base an action on these specific acts of negligence. A seller of a chattel
manufactured by another may also be subject to liability for failing to
warn consumers of dangers or defects in that product. Section 399 of the
Restatement imposes upon wholesalers and retailers the duty to warn

of dangers inherent in the use of a product, the same duty considered
above in connection with manufacturers under section 388.64 However,

unlike manufacturers, the Restatement, in section 402, imposes no duty
on sellers to test and inspect items for latent flaws.

65

The questions

whether and under what circumstances a vendor in Pennsylvania is
under a duty to inspect are controversial ones.66 When the item is received
58. 428 Pa. 334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968).
59. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) ov TORTS § 400 (1965).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op TORTS § 400, comment d at 338-39 (1965).
61. See Forry v. Gulf Oil Co., 428 Pa. 334, 344, 237 A.2d 593, 599 (1968).
62. See id. at 349-50, 237 A.2d at 602 (dissenting opinion).
63. 2 L. FRUMMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18.01[2] (1967).
64. See note 44 supra.
Section 399 also subjects the retailer and wholesaler to liability under sections
389 and 390. See note 57 supra.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

Op TORTS § 402 (1965)

reads as follows:

A seller of a chattel manufactured by a third person, who neither knows nor has
reason to know that it is, or is likely to be, dangerous, is not liable in an action
for negligence for harm caused by the character or condition of the chattel because
of his failure to discover the danger by an inspection or test of the chattel before

selling it.

66. See Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability, 89 U. PA. L. Rgv. 306 (1941)
Eldredge, Vendor's "Duty" to Inspect Chattels - A Reply, 45 DicK. L. REv. 269
(1941) ; Farage, Must a Vendor Inspect Chattels Before Their Salef - An Answer,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
45 DicK. L. REv. 159 (1941) ; Farage, Vendor's Duty to Inspect Chattels - A

Rejoinder, 45 DIcx. L. REv. 282 (1941).
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by a retailer or wholesaler in its original package, Pennsylvania imposes no
duty to unpack and inspect the article for concealed dangers. 67 Where
the item is unsealed or the original package broken, however, the issue
whether there is an obligation to examine the article for hidden dangers
is problematical. In Ebbert v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,6S the plaintiff
brought an action against the defendant retailer of a washing machine
for injuries sustained when a safety device on the machine failed to
function properly. The defendant retailer maintained a staff of 100
men to service his appliances. When faced with the question of whether
the retailer was under a duty to inspect for latent defects, the court,
assuming that the staff was maintained to test and demonstrate appliances
before they were sold, held that the retailer assumed this duty. Ebbert has
been interpreted as imposing on retailers a duty to inspect unsealed
articles. 69
A reevaluation of this interpretation seems necessary, however, in light
of Pennsylvania's adoption of section 402.70 The language of that section,
as well as the comments to it, state a policy at variance with the imposition of a duty to inspect items, whether sealed or unsealed, for concealed dangers. In addition, the appendix to section 402 severely criticizes
Ebbert and cases similar to it in other jurisdictions. It would seem, therefore, that the adoption of section 402 should limit Ebbert to its facts.
Thus, the rule appears to be that a seller of a product manufactured by
another is not subject to liability for failure to inspect either sealed or
unsealed items, unless that duty is expressly assumed.
Although there is no duty to inspect for hidden dangers, actual knowledge of a defect or special circumstances which should put the seller on
notice of a flaw should raise a duty to warn. This is the rule stated by
section 401 of the Restatement.71 The comments appended thereto indicate
that the section was intended to include situations where the seller
should have been alerted to the danger by special knowledge gained
through experience with the product, where he purchased the item from
an unknown itinerant salesman, or where he recklessly misrepresented
that the item was safe when in fact a reasonable man would have realized
67. See, e.g., Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Brown, 107 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Kratz
v. American Stores Co., 359 Pa. 335, 59 A.2d 138 (1948); Coralnick v. Abbotts
Dairies, Inc., 337 Pa. 344, 11 A.2d 143 (1940) ; Ebbert v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 330
Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938) ; West v. Emanuel, 198 Pa. 180, 47 A. 965 (1901);
McSorley v. Katz, 53 Pa. Super. 243 (1913) ; Checchio v. S. Goldman Sons, 8 Pa.
D. & C. 1 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1925).
68. 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402 (1965), appendix at 458-59
(1965) ; 2 L. FRUMMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18.03[1] [b] (1967).
70. See McMeekin v. Gimbel Bros., 223 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa. 1963) ; Johnston
v. Dick, 401 Pa. 637, 165 A.2d 634 (1960).
71. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) ov TORTS § 401 (1965) reads as follows:
A seller of a chattel manufactured by a third person who knows or has reason
to know that the chattel is, or is likely to be, dangerous when used by a person
to whom it is delivered or for whose use it is supplied, or to others to whom
the seller should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to
liability for bodily harm caused thereby to them if he fails to exercise reasonable
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the contrary. No Pennsylvania case has been found adopting section 401
as it now stands. The original section, which has been adopted in Pennsylvania, 72 was completely rewritten. 73 However, since both sections state
the same basic policy of reliance on the competence of the seller it is
reasonable to assume that Pennsylvania will accept the present statement
of the rule.
D.

The Expansion of MacPherson

Under the present interpretation of the MacPherson rule, manufacturers, distributors, and retailers cannot immunize themselves from liability for their negligence because of lack of privity. Moreover, the rule
has been expanded in Pennsylvania to encompass other situations where
the defense of lack of privity was once available.
Sections 403 and 404 of the Restatement, adopted by Pennsylvania
in Wissman v. General Tire Co., 74 impose on independent contractors
who make, rebuild, or repair chattels the duties of a manufacturer. Under
section 403, an independent contractor who knows or has reason to know
that his labor has made a chattel unsafe for use is under a duty to warn
foreseeable plaintiffs of the danger.75 Section 404 imposes on the independent contractor the duty to exercise due care in his rebuilding and repairing, in the adoption of plans and designs, and in the selection and inspec76
tion of the materials he employs.

In addition to independent contractors who rebuild and repair chattels, other servicing contractors have been held subject to the rule of
72. See Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Brown, 107 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Ebbert v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938).
73. RESTATEMENT Ov TORTS § 401 (1934), reads:
A vendor of a chattel made by a third person which is bought as safe for use
in reliance upon the vendor's profession of competence and care is subject to
liability for bodily harm caused by the vendor's failure to exercise reasonable
competence and care to supply the chattel in a condition safe for use.
74. 327 Pa. 215, 192 A. 633 (1937); accord, Frantz v. General Motors Corp.,
176 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Doyle v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 357 Pa. 92, 53 A.2d 68 (1947).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 403 (1965) reads:
One who as an independent contractor makes, rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for
another and turns it over to the other, knowing or having reason to know that
his work has made it dangerous for the use for which it is turned over, is subject
to the same liability as if he supplied the chattel.
This section, in addition to imposing the duty to warn, imposes duties under sections 389 and 390. See note 57 supra.
The caveat appended to section 403 raises an interesting question. The
caveat reads:
The Institute expresses no opinion that a contractor who fails to exercise
reasonable care to inform his employer of a dangerous condition, which he is not
employed to repair, but which he discovers in the course of making the repairs
agreed upon and of which he realizes that his employer is unaware, may not
be subject to the liability stated in this Section.
In the Wissman case this exact situation arose, but the defendant did in fact warn
of the danger. The court did not rule whether, in absence of the warning, the defendant would have been subject to liability. No case seems to have passed on this
point. See 1 L. FRUMMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.03[3] (1967).
76. RESTATEMXNT (S4coND) or TORTS § 404 (1965) reads:
One who as an independent contractor negligently makes, rebuilds, or repairs
a chattel for another is subject to the same liability as that imposed upon negligent
manufacturers of chattels.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
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MacPherson. In Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co.,7 v the defendant,

who was under a contract with a municipality to supply water to fire
hydrants, was held liable to the plaintiff, a citizen of the municipality, for
damage to the latter's home resulting from a water failure during a fire. In
support of its holding that lack of privity was no defense to the action, the
court quoted extensively from MacPherson.75 Similarly, in Evans v. Otis
Elevator Co.,79 the defendant elevator company, which had contracted

with plaintiff's employer to inspect elevators, was held subject to liability
for failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its obligation.
Bailors of chattels have also been enveloped by MacPherson. Bailors
for hire are subject to liability under sections 407 and 408 of the Restatement, adopted in Pennsylvania in Lambert v. Richards-Kelly Constr. Co.5 0
By virtue of section 407, lessors of chattels who know or have reason to
know that the leased chattel is dangerous to use are obligated to warn of
the danger under section 388 ;81 section 408 imposes the duty to inspect
chattels which are leased for immediate use for latent dangers. 8 2 The liability of gratuitous bailees is governed by section 405 which imposes the
obligation to warn of dangers under section 388.83 However, no duty to
inspect for hidden dangers is imposed, and in this respect the gratuitous
bailee is treated the same as the seller of chattels manufactured by
another.

84

Under the law of Pennsylvania, builders who negligently erect structures are liable to foreseeable plaintiffs notwithstanding lack of privity.
This rule developed without reliance on MacPherson, although its in77. 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964).
78. It is interesting to note that Justice Cardozo refused to extend MacPherson
on similar facts in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E.
896 (1928).
79. 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961).
80. 348 Pa. 407, 35 A.2d 76 (1944) ; see Dunn v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 391 Pa. 65,
137 A.2d 262 (1958) ; Trusty v. Patterson, 299 Pa. 469, 149 A. 717 (1930).
81. RESTATEMENT (ScoNND) op TORTS § 407 (1965) reads:
A lessor who leases a chattel for the use of others, knowing or having reason to
know that it is or is likely to be dangerous for the purpose for which it is to be
used, is subject to liability as a supplier of a chattel.
This section includes liability under sections 389 and 390. See note 57 supra.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op TORTS § 408 (1965) reads:
One who leases a chattel as safe for immediate use is subject to liability to those
whom he should expect to use the chattel, or to be endangered by its probable
use, for physical harm caused by its use in a manner for which, and by a person
for whose use, it is leased, if the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to make
it safe for such use or to disclose its actual condition to those who may be
expected to use it.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 405 (1965) reads:
One who directly or through a third person gives or lends a chattel for another
to use, knowing or having reason to know that it is or is likely to be dangerous
for the use for which it is given or lent, is subject to the same liability as a
supplier of the chattel.
This section also includes liability under sections 389 and 390. See note 57
supra.
Robinson v. Van Mos, 37 Pa. D. & C. 286 (C.P. Beaver County 1939), the
only Pennsylvania case applying section 388 to gratuitous bailees, is inconclusive in
its interpretation of the section. The court raised but did not answer the question
whether the duty of a gratuitous bailee is limited to dangers about which he actually
has knowledge.
84. by
See
pp. 804-05
supra.Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
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fluence was undoubtedly substantial. It will be remembered that the
requirement of privity in Pennsylvania evolved historically in defective
building, not in defective manufacturing situations.85 In Curtin v. Somerset,8 6 the court established the rule requiring privity of contract between
the negligent builder and the injured plaintiff. Forty years later, in Grodstein v. McGivern,87 the wife of the owner of a building sued the builder
for injuries sustained as a result of his negligence. The court granted
recovery, holding that an "exception" to the Curtin rule existed where it
was reasonable to expect that the builder could foresee injury to the plain8
tiff. Although the holding of Grodstein effectively overrules Curtin,"
subsequent courts confronted with the same issue have only admitted
that Curtin was "modified." These same courts, however, have continued
to distinguish Curtin out of existence.8 9 In Krisovich v. John Booth, Inc.,
the court swept away the deadwood of such distinctions when it said:
Following the Grodstein case ... our Supreme Court has consistently
extended the principle of the MacPherson case by imposing liability
also on any person who on behalf of the possessor of land negligently
creates an artificial condition resulting in injury to others ....90
E.

Causation

An essential prerequisite to the establishment of a cause of action
in negligence is proof that the defendant's negligence proximately caused
plaintiff's injury. In products liability cases such proof consists of showing
first that a defect in the defendant's product or the defendant's failure to
warn was a cause of plaintiff's injury, 91 and second, that it was a proximate
or legal cause of his injury. In Majors v. Brodhead Hotel the court stated:
It is well established in Pennsylvania that in order to find that defendent proximately caused an injury it must be found that his
allegedly wrongful conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about
plaintiff's injury even though it need not be the only factor.9"
The substantial factor test of proximate causation applied in Pennsylvania
is essentially that adopted by the Restatement in section 431. If the de85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See p. 795 supra.
140 Pa. 70, 21 A.244 (1891).
303 Pa. 555, 154 A. 794 (1931).
See L.ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 106 (1941).
See Bisson v.John B. Kelly, Inc., 314 Pa. 99, 170 A. 139 (1934) ; Griffith v.

Atlantic Ref. Co., 305 Pa. 386, 157 A. 791 (1931) ;Bastl v. Papale, 142 Pa. Super. 33,
15 A.2d 476 (1940).
90. 181 Pa. Super. 5, 10, 121 A.2d 890, 892 (1956).
The court quoted section 385 of the Restatement as the law of Pennsylvania.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) ov TORTS § 385 (1965) reads:
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any
other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land
for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or
condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules
as those determining the liability of one who as a manufacturer or independent
contractor makes a chattel for the use of others.
91. See Ucci v. Keane, 402 Pa. 467, 167 A.2d 147 (1961); 1 L. FRUMMER &
M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11.01 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
92. 416 Pa. 265, 271, 205 A.2d 873, 877 (1965).
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fendent's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's
injury the fact that the defendant could not foresee that this harm would
be brought about, or in what manner it would occur, would not prevent
him from being held liable. 93 If, however, the court finds that it was
"highly extraordinary" that the defendant's negligence should have
brought about plaintiff's harm, defendant's negligence may be held not
94
to be a legal cause of such harm.
The issue often arises in products liability cases as to whether the
length of time which has elapsed between the time of manufacture and the
time of sale prevents defendant's negligence from being a legal cause of
plaintiff's injury. In Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co.95 the court held
that such lapse of time, in and of itself, was insufficient to sever causation.
This holding is consistent with section 433 of the Restatement which states
that lapse of time is merely a factor to consider in determining whether
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in plaintiff's injury. 96
The issue of proximate causation arises most often where a defendant
manufacturer asserts that although his negligence was a substantial factor
in causing plaintiff's harm, the intervening negligence of a third party
superseded his negligence. 97 In some cases the manufacturer may claim
that the failure of a third party to perform his duty to inspect an item
superseded his negligence. It will be remembered that a manufacturer
has a duty to inspect the component parts he receives from another 98
and that the lessor of a chattel for immediate use is under a duty to
inspect the chattel before he leases it. 99 In addition, under Section 392
of the Restatement adopted by Pennsylvania in Saganowich v. Hachikian,100 an employer who supplies his employees with chattels to be used
in the employer's business is obligated to examine the chattels for latent
dangers. 101 The effect of a failure to inspect is resolved by section 396
of the Restatement, adopted in Pennsylvania in Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des
TORTS § 435(1) (1965).
ov TORTS § 435(2) (1965).
95. 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
96. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) o TORTS § 433(c) (1965).
97. RPSTATEMNT (SEcoND) op TORTS § 440 defines superseding cause as follows:
A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his
antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.
98. See p. 799 supra.
99. See p.807 supra.
100. 348 Pa. 313, 35 A.2d 343 (1944) ; accord, Labick v. Vicker, 200 Pa. Super. 111,
186 A.2d 874 (1962).
101. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 392 (1965) reads:
One who supplies to another, directly or through a third person, a chattel to be
used for the supplier's business purposes is subject to liability to those for whose
use the chattel is supplied, or to those whom he should expect to be endangered
by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the
manner for which and by persons for whose use the chattel is supplied
93. RESTATMENT (SEcoND)
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

or

(a) if the supplier fails to exercise reasonable care to make the chattel safe

for the use for which it is supplied, or
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Moines Co.,10 2 which states the rule that such failure does not break the

chain of causation. 10 3 In other cases the manufacturer may assert that a
third party's negligence, other than a failure to inspect, superseded his
negligence. Pennsylvania courts resolve the issue by asking whether the
intervening negligence was foreseeable. 0 4 For example, in Smith v.
Hobart Mfg. Co.10 the court held that the plaintiff employee in an action
against a manufacturer for injuries sustained by the operation of a meat
grinder failed to present sufficient evidence that the latter could foresee
that the employer would remove the grinder's safety guard. On the
other hand, in Heichel v. Lima-Hamilton Corp.106 the court held that where
the manufacturer failed to provide a safety guard on a mining machine, the
employer's continued operation of the machine was insufficient to defeat the
employee's action. Similarly, an employer's knowledge of a dangerously
designed chattel or of a danger latent in its use will not insulate the
07
manufacturer from liability to an injured employee.1
F.

The Doctrine of Exclusive Control

The doctrine of exclusive control eases the plaintiff's burden of
proving negligence by raising an inference of negligence in certain
situations. In Loch v. Confair, the court expressed the doctrine of exclusive control in the following terms:
The theory of exclusive control is that, when the instrumentality which
causes the injury is shown to be under the management and control
of the defendant, and the accident is such that in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management and
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of
102. 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949) ; accord, Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp.,

261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958), modified, 271 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying Pennsylvania Law).
103. RPSTATEMNT (SnconD) op TORTS § 396 (1965) reads:
A manufacturer of a chattel is subject to liability under the rules stated in §§ 394
and 395 although the dangerous character or condition of the chattel is discoverable by an inspection which the seller or any other person is under a duty
to the person injured to make.
Section 396 is consistent with Section 452(1) of the Restatement which reads:
[T]he failure of a third person to act to prevent harm to another threatened by
the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of such harm.
104. This follows RtSTATgVMNT (S~coND) Op' TORTS § 447 (1965) which states:
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done
in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a
third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the
third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that
the third person had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the
actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily
negligent.
105. 302 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1962).
106. 98 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (applying Pennsylvania law).
107. See Brandon v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 220 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
Montesano v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 213 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Pa. 1962). But see
Wissman v. General Tire Co., 327 Pa. 215, 192 A. 633 (1937) (concurring opinion).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10

18

Benner et al.: Products Liability in Pennsylvania
SUMMER

1968]

COMMENTS

explanation by defendant, that the accident was due to negligence. It
is a doctrine applicable only where the proof as to the cause of accident is peculiarly or exclusively within the possession of the defendant. 108
The requirement that the instrumentality be in the exclusive control of
the defendant places the burden on the plaintiff to prove that no factors
which might have caused the accident intervened between the defendant's
control and the plaintiff's injury. 10 9
The exclusive control requirement would also seem to preclude application of the doctrine against multiple defendants. In Loch v. Confair,10
however, the court alleviated the plaintiff's burden of proof where both
the manufacturer and retailer are sued jointly, by raising an inference
that one or the other of the joint defendants was negligent. The inference
places the responsibility on the manufacturer and retailer to prove the
cause of the accident. In Braccia v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,"' however,
the court refused to extend the doctrine of Loch where the manufacturer
was the sole defendant, thereby declining to shift the burden of proof to
a single defendant.
G.

Defenses

As in all negligence cases, the defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk are available to the defendant." 2 Where the plaintiff bases his cause of action on defendant's failure to warn of a latent
danger, however, a special problem arises. Where no warning of the
danger is given, the availability of the defenses should be limited to
situations where the plaintiff is aware of the risk. The theory behind
this limitation is that "[t]o allow these defenses is to indulge in circular
reasoning, since usually the plaintiff cannot be said to have assumed the
108. 372 Pa. 212, 216-17, 93 A.2d 451, 453 (1953).

The Pennslyvania doctrine of exclusive control is similar to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur as it is known in other jurisdictions. Res ipsa loquitur exists in
Pennsylvania, but has different procedural consequences and is restricted to cases
"involving injury to passengers through the transportation operations of common
carriers or to patrons of utilities .....Sierocinski v. E.I. DuPont De Nernours & Co.,
118 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1941). Accord, Ambrose v. Western Maryland Ry., 368

Pa. 1,81 A.2d 895 (1951).
109. See Sweeney v.Blue Anchor Beverage Co., 325 Pa. 216, 189 A. 331 (1937)

Werner v. Armour & Co., 320 Pa. 440, 183 A. 48 (1936) ;Rozumailski v. Philadelphia
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 A. 700 (1929); Miller v. Meadville Food
Serv., Inc., 173 Pa. Super. 357, 98 A.2d 452 (1953) ; Dillon v. William S. Scull Co.,
164 Pa. Super. 365, 64 A.2d 525 (1949) ; Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa.
Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931); Murphy v. Yuengling Dairy Prods. Corp., 34 Pa.
D. & C. 355 (C.P. Schuylkill County 1938).
Exclusive control does not require the instrumentality to be in the actual
possession of the defendant. See cases cited supra this note. But see Martin v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 281 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1960) ; Leggieri v. Philadelphia
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 171 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
110. 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).

111. 398 Pa. 386, 157 A.2d 747 (1960).

112. See Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

358 U.S.
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risk of which he was ignorant or to have contributed to his own injury
when he had no way of reasonably ascertaining that the danger of injury
existed."' 1 3 Although Pennsylvania apparently has not had the opportunity to pass on the issue, most courts have failed to see the logic of this
4
theory and hold that the defenses are available in all cases."
Where the defendant does give a warning, the question is whether
it was sufficient to make the plaintiff cognizant of the danger, 115 because
failure to heed an adequate warning will establish a defense.'1 6 Conversely, inadequacy of a warning should preclude establishment of a
7
defense under the same reasoning as above in the no-warning cases.1
Another defense in products liability negligence actions arises where
the plaintiff's injury results from an unforeseen use of the product. For
example, in Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 11 the plaintiff sought to hold
the defendant manufacturer responsible for the death of her husband,
both on negligence and breach of warranty theories, when wire rope
used to support a scaffold snapped. The court held with reference to the
breach of warranty action that the decedent did not use the rope for a
purpose intended by the manufacturer as manifested in a manual supplied
with the rope. A similar analysis is appropriate in negligence actions.
III.

THE

CAUSE

OF ACTION

IN

WARRANTY

A second theory of recovery, long known to Pennsylvania, is that
of breach of warranty." 9 The common law developed many concepts
in the warranty field which were eventually codified in the Uniform
Sales Act.' 20 The subsequent enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1 2 1 although drafted within the framework of the Sales Act, modified
warranty law. The Code preserves the traditional nomenclature of express
and implied warranties; however, with respect to each warranty, the Code
has made substantial changes. The purpose of this section is to analyze
the changes and to discuss the judicial treatment of some problems that
113. Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn,
41 VA. L. R9v. 145, 163 (1955).
As to knowledge from an independent source see Hopkins v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 212 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954).
114. See Dillard & Hart, supra note 113, at 163.
115. See p. 801 supra.
116. See Oettinger v. Norton Co., 160 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 253
F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1958).
117. See Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945).
118. 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
119. The concept of seller's warranties predates Pennsylvania's adoption of the

Uniform Sales Act in 1915. See Fraley v. Bisham, 10 Pa. 320 (1849) ; McFarland v.
Newman, 9 Watts 55 (Pa. 1839) ; Armstrong v. Descalzi, 48 Pa. Super. 171 (1911)
Pyott v. Baltz, 38 Pa. Super. 608 (1909).
120. Some common law concepts were not continued in the Sales Act. For instance, the technical requirements of specific words or intention as conditions precedent
to a seller's liability based on breach of an express warranty was bypassed in favor of

reasonable reliance on the buyer's part to the seller's expressions. Furthermore, the

Uniform Sales Act implied certain warranties of quality independent of any contract
for sale. Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Pa. Laws 543, §§ 12-16.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 2-312 to -318 (Supp. 1967).
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have arisen with respect to those changes. The ensuing analysis will focus
on Code cases, but resort will be made to pre-Code cases where necessary
for additional insight and illustration.
A.
1.

Classification of the Warranties

The Express Warranty

Prior to Pennsylvania's adoption of the Uniform Sales Act a cause
of action for breach of express warranty required the buyer to establish
that the seller intended to become answerable for his affirmations of
fact.' 22 Both the Sales Act and the Code have abrogated the requirement
of intent; the means by which it has been eliminated, however, differs
under each. The Sales Act specified that any affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller relating to the goods constituted an express warranty
if the natural tendency of such expression was to induce the buyer to
purchase the goods in reliance on it. 123 Thus, for example, where the

seller stated that rolls of barbed wire were a certain length and it was
shown that the buyer relied on the statement, the court concluded that
an express warranty had been created with respect to the wire's length.' 24
Unlike the Sales Act which based an express warranty on the buyer's
reliance, the Code bases its concept of express warranty on the "dickered
aspects" of the bargain. 12 The Code provides that an express warranty
may be formulated in one of three situations:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall con120
form to the affirmation or promise.
122. See, e.g., Holmes v. Tyson, 147 Pa. 305, 23 A. 564 (1892); Pyott v. Baltz,
38 Pa. Super. 608 (1909) ; McAllister v. Morgan, 29 Pa. Super. 476 (1905) ; Jaeger,
Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L. Rev. 1 (1963).
123. Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Pa. Laws 543, § 12. The Code is more explicit:
It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-313(2) (Supp. 1967). See Pritchard v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
124. Farrey's, Inc. v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 103 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Pa.
1952) ; see Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (tables of tensile
strength contained in manufacturer's manual) ; Elliot-Lewis Corp. v. York-Shipley,
Inc., 372 Pa. 346, 94 A.2d 47 (1953) (representations appearing in manufacturer's
catalog). But cf. Madison-Kipp Corp. v. Price Battery Corp., 311 Pa. 22, 166 A. 377
(1933) ; see generally Comment, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 521 (1959).
125. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 1. Although not defined by
the Code or the official comments, the phrase "dickered aspects" of the bargain probably means that part of the agreement which constitutes some part of the consideration.
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-313(1) (a) (Supp. 1967). In Babcock Poultry
Farm, Inc. v. Shook, 204 Pa. Super. 141, 206 A.2d 399 (1964), the seller's promises
that certain chicks would produce as well or better than the buyer's old strain was
sufficient to charge him with having made an express warranty. For an analysis of
the section's impact on national advertising see Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966) ; Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 616, 187 A.2d 575, 578 (1963); Jarnot v. Ford
Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1960) ; Richter v. Ford Motor Co.,
Published
by Villanova
University
CharlesMontgomery
Widger SchoolCounty
of Law Digital
85 Mont.
Co. L.R.
451 (C.P.
1965);Repository,
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(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the description. 127
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods
shall conform to the sample or model. 128
In examining the Code's treatment of express warranties it becomes
apparent that sections 12, 14, and 16 of the Sales Act 129 have been consolidated and reclassified so that, instead of raising implied warranties
that the bulk will correspond to the sample or description, express war-:
ranties are created to that effect. This change in classification is more in
the spirit of logical consistency than in substance, and section 2-313
should not materially alter the results of much pre-Code case law. 30
The Code's shift in emphasis from reliance, required in the Sales
Act, to the "dickered aspects" of the bargain has, however, occasioned
a subtle change in the law with reference to sales by description and.
sample. The Code has relieved the buyer of the affirmative task of establishing particular reliance on the seller's sales talk' 3 ' by establishing a
presumption that any sample or description, just as any affirmation of fact,
is intended to become part of the basis of the bargain. 13 2 Not all statements of the seller can be fairly characterized as becoming part of the
basis of the bargain. Accordingly, the Code continues to follow the.
Sales Act distinction between affirmations of fact and mere puffing by
relegating "an affirmation . ..of the value . . . or a statement purporting

to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods'

33

to

Co., 84 Mont. Co. L.R. 142 (C.P. Montgomery County 1964) ; Comment, 48 MARQ.
L. Rv.521 (1959).
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-313(1) (b) (Supp. 1967). See Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1965) (applying Pennsylvania law)!;
Fox Pools, Inc. v. Villarose, 77 York Leg. Rec. 165 (C.P. York County 1964).
The Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-313, Comment 5, explains what is
meant by a description as follows:
A description need not be by words. Technical specifications, blueprints and
the like can afford more exact description than mere language and if made part
of the basis of the bargain goods must conform with them. Past deliveries may
set the description of quality, either expressly or impliedly by course of dealing.
Of course, all descriptions by merchants must be read against the applicable
trade usages with the general rules as to merchantability resolving any doubts.
128. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-313(1) (c) (Supp. 1967). See Loomis Bros. v.
Queen, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 482 (C.P. Delaware County 1957).
129. Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Pa. Laws 543, §§ 12, 14, 16.
130. W. HAWKLAND, SALtS AND BULK SALSs 38 (1958). Ostensibly, the result
of such cases as Acro Metalscraft Co. v. Shaw, 364 Pa. 39, 70 A.2d 850 (1950);
Bechtold v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 321 Pa. 423, 184 A. 49 (1936) ; C.D. Brown Co.
v. Standard Hide Co., 301 Pa. 543, 152 A. 557 (1930); and Hanes v. Cameron, 267
Pa. 90, 110 A. 81 (1920) would remain unchanged.
131. UNIFORM COMMXRCIAL CODX § 2-313, Comment 3.
132. Id.
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-313(2) (Supp. 1967). This section was not
designed, however, to foreclose a buyer's remedy for misrepresentation when the
seller's statements of value are shown to be false. UNIFORM COmMERCIAL COD4 § 2-313,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
Comment 8.
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non-warranty status. Consequently, mild exaggerations1 3 4 or statements
such as "My wares are as good as anyone else's" would not lead to any
different result today than prior to the adoption of the Code in Pennsylvania. 13 5
The paramount consideration in establishing an express warranty
is whether the language or sample constitutes part of the basis of the
bargain. The Code's language, unfortunately, does not define "basis of
the bargain." A reasonable interpretation of this term of art is that it
refers to an affirmation of the seller which becomes part of the contract
and constitutes an element of the consideration given by the seller in
exchange for the buyer's obligation. 136 Moreover, conduct subsequent
to the closing of the contract which would otherwise result in the creation
of an express warranty had it occurred during the negotiation stage, is
not denied that classification if such conduct formed some part of the
basis of the bargain.13 7 Although no Code cases on point have been
found, the official comments of the Code indicate that the subsequent
warranty should be considered as a modification of the original contract
and therefore become binding without the need for additional consid138
eration.
2.

The Implied Warranties of Quality

Historically, sales warranties were considered as consensual elements
of a contract. Consequently, the now commonplace warranties of quality
did not automatically arise with each sale. 13 9 The law, however, has
developed to the point that it recognizes two distinct warranties of
quality 140 which arise by operation of law and exist independently of the
41
contract, and therefore will be imposed unless effectively disclaimed.'
The first, the implied warranty of merchantability, 142 corresponds
with section 15(2) of the Sales Act ;143 the second, the implied warranty
134. See Michelin Tire Co. v. Schulz, 295 Pa. 140, 145 A. 67 (1929) ; Rothermel
v. Phillips, 292 Pa. 371, 141 A. 241 (1928).
135. See Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953)
Madison-Kipp Corp. v. Price Battery Corp., 311 Pa. 22, 166 A. 377 (1933) ; Jarecki
Mfg. Co. v. Kerr, 165 Pa. 529, 30 A. 1019 (1895) ; Walker v. Kirk, 72 Pa. Super. 534
(1919). But see Babcock Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Shook, 204 Pa. Super. 141, 206 A.2d
399 (1964).
With respect to the special problems of advertising see note 126 supra.
136. Cf. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 616, 187 A.2d 575, 579
(1963).
137. UNIFORM COMMSRCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 7.
138. Id. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-209 (Supp. 1967); but see
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-209 & Comment 3, -201, -202.
139. See McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55 (Pa. 1839).
140. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 2-314 and -315 (Supp. 1967).

141. See Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109
A.2d 202 (1955). For a discussion of how implied warranties are disclaimed see
pp. 820-23 infra.
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-314 (Supp. 1967).
143. Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Pa. Laws 543, § 15(2) provided:
Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods
of that description . . . there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of
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of fitness for a particular purpose,'
basically re-codifies sections
15(1), (4), and (5) of the Sales Act. 145 Although these warranties frequently attach to the same transaction and correspondingly overlap,' 146
the distinction between the two certainly exceeds semantics. In Pritchard
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. the court expressed the distinction as

follows:
Under a warranty of fitness for a particular use, the seller
warrants that the goods sold are suitable for the special purpose
of the buyer, while the warranty of merchantability is that the goods
are reasonably fit for the general purposes for which they are sold.14T
One commentator has ably illustrated the difference:
If a seller sold to a buyer an automobile that would not run, both
warranties would be breached. An automobile that does not run is
not an average automobile, nor does it fit the particular purpose
(transportation) of the buyer, which is impliedly made known to the
seller. On the other hand, if the buyer made known to the seller
that he wanted the automobile for speed-racing purposes, the delivery
to him of a fair, average car would satisfy seller's obligation relating
to merchantability, but it would be a breach of the warranty of fitness
for the particular purpose. 148
The question of which implied warranty will arise in a given fact
situation may be perplexing. Depending on the particular circumstances
of a transaction, either the warranty of merchantability or the warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose or both may arise.
The Code provision on the implied warranty of merchantability
reads in part as follows:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale
144. PA. STA. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-315 (Supp. 1967).
145. Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Pa. Laws 543, § 15 provided:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears
that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment . . . there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under its
patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any
particular purpose.
(5) An implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for a
particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade.
146. HAWKLAND, supra note 130, at 42; Bailey, Sales Warranties,Product Liability
WILLAMtTnIr L.J. 291, 301 (1967);
see Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965) ; Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963) ; Q. Vandenberg & Sons v.
Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964); DeGraff v. Myers Foods, Inc., 19
Pa. D. & C.2d 19 (C.P. Bucks County 1958). See generally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A,

and the UCC: A Lab Analysis of the Cases, 4

§ 2-317 (Supp. 1967).
147. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
148. HAWKLAND, supra note 130, at 42.
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if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under
this section the serving for value of food 149
or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
This section states two fundamental requirements in order for the warranty
of merchantability to arise. First, the goods must be obtained from a
merchant, and second, there must be a sale or a contract of sale. Ordinarily,
the "merchant" requirement is easily complied with in light of the Code's
expansive definition of the term. The statute defines a merchant as a
person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge
or skill may be attributed by his employment .... 110
A questionable lower court decision, however, denied recovery when it
characterized the defendant, who had furnished and installed an inadequate stoker boiler unit for the plaintiffs, as a handyman rather than as
a merchant. 151
As to the second requirement, that there be a sale, the Pennsylvania
case of Loch v. Confair'52 is instructive. In that case the plaintiff, injured
by a soda bottle which exploded when her husband lifted it from the
store's shelf, sued the supermarket in which the incident occurred. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied the imposition of warranty liability
on the ground that, since the soda had not been purchased at the time
it exploded, there was neither a sale nor a contract for sale. Notwithstanding the Code's language and the Loch decision, the warranty of merchantability is not restricted to technical sales, but has been extended to
merchants who, instead of selling, lease their wares. 153 The warranty
15 4
does not extend, however, to sales of services.
Assuming that the warranty of merchantability exists, the question
arises as to whether the seller's goods meet the standards of merchantability.
Although merchantability was not defined by the Sales Act, the courts
considered goods merchantable if they were reasonably fit for the general
149. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-314(1) (Supp. 1967).
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-104(1) (Supp. 1967). See also Sedgwick,
Conley & Sleight, Products Liability: Implied Warranties, 48 MARQ. L. Rev. 139,
140 (1964).
151. Victor v. Barzaleski, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 698 (C.P. Luzerne County 1959).
152. 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
153. See, e.g., Demos Constr. Co. v. Service Supply Corp., 153 Pa. Super. 623,
34 A.2d 828 (1943);

Hartford Battery Sales Corp. v. Price, 119 Pa. Super. 165,

181 A. 95 (1935); Airco Distrib. Co. v. Stuccio, 45 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 67 (C.P.
Luzerne County 1955).

The implied warranty of merchantability attaches irrespective of whether

the goods are new or used. See Goepfert v. Town Motors Automotive Co., 1 Bucks
Co. L.R. 134 (C.P. Bucks County 1951); cf. McKeage Mach. Co. v. Osborne &
Seaton Mach. Co., 124 Pa. Super. 387, 188 A. 543 (1936). See also UNIVORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 3.
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or ordinary purposes for which they were sold,155 or if the) were of
fair and average quality, free from harmful defects. 5" While the Code
does not purport to define merchantability, unlike the Sales Act, it does
set forth certain minimal objective standards which must be satisfied
before the product is considered of merchantable quality. The merchandise must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
157

container or label if any.

The fact that the Code has delineated the concept of merchantability
does not suggest that the fundamental tenets of that concept have changed.
Unlike the warranty of merchantability, the warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose does not arise automatically with the sale, but
attaches only when two conditions, common to both the Sales Act and the
Code, are met. Section 2-315 of the Code provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next
section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
As to the first condition, that the seller have reason to know of the
buyer's particular purpose, "reason to know" does not require that the
buyer formally communicate his purpose for purchasing the seller's goods
directly to the seller. The key is that the seller be made reasonably aware
of his buyer's purposes, and the means by which the seller acquires
information sufficient to charge him with such knowledge is irrelevant. 58
155. See, e.g., Eimco Corp. v. Joseph Lombardi & Sons, 193 Pa. Super. 1, 162 A.2d
263 (1960) ; Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d
202 (1955).
156. HAWKLAND, supra note 130, at 41. See, e.g., Frantz Equip. Co. v. Leo Butler
Co., 370 Pa. 459, 465, 88 A.2d 702, 706 (1952).

157. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-314(2) (Supp.
158. Sedgwick, Conley & Sleight, supra note 150, at
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585

1967).
147. See Boeing Airplane Co.

(8th Cir. 1964) (applying Pennsylvania law).
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When the buyer attempts to establish that the seller had knowledge
of his particular purpose problems of proof may arise because of the
parol evidence rule. Under section 2-202 of the Code the terms of a
writing intended by the parties as the final expression of their agreement
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior or contemporaneous
agreement, although it may be supplemented or explained by consistent
additional terms. 159 It may be argued that, since the warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose is an implied warranty, it arises independently
of the express contract of the parties by operation of law, and as such
it is either not contradictory to the terms of the contract or is a supplemental, consistent, additional term.' 60 This position is buttressed by the
fact that section 2-316 requires that words or conduct negating express
warranties comply with the parol evidence rule; it makes no similar
requirement with respect to implied warranties. Hence, a buyer's statements which indicate his intended use of a product should be admissible
to show that a seller had reason to know the particular purpose for which
the goods are needed.
The second condition necessary to the creation of a warranty of fitness is that the buyer rely on the seller's skill or judgment in furnishing a
suitable product. Thus, where the seller proved that the buyer had
not relied on the seller's expertise, but rather on his own tests and inspections, the seller established a valid defense to the buyer's action for breach
of the fitness warranty. 1 1 Analogously, a seller successfully avoided imposition of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose by proving
that the buyer's reliance was placed on his own detailed specifications, and
not on the seller's skill in the selection process.' 62 However, notwithstanding the submission of certain instructions as to type and color of paper
by the buyer, reliance has been predicated upon the seller's skill in
selecting the proper quality of material for the buyer's purpose. 1 63
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-202 (Supp. 1967) provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of
performance (Section 2-208) ; and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement
of the terms of the agreement.
160. See Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. 643, 109 A.2d
202 (1954).
161. See Vacuum Concrete Corp. v. Berlanti Constr. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 548,
214 A.2d 729 (1965) ; Pantano v. Zamer Motor Sales Co., 170 Pa. Super. 317, 85
A.2d 681 (1952).
162. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. J. Jacob Shannon & Co., 363 Pa. 438, 70 A.2d
321 (1950); Hill & MacMillan, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 Pa. 18, 155 A. 103 (1931);
Vacuum Concrete Corp. v. Berlanti Constr. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 548, 214 A.2d 729
(1965) ; Royal Pioneer Paper Box Mfg. Co. v. DeJonge, 179 Pa. 155, 115 A.2d 837
(1955) (dictum).
163. Royal Pioneer Box Mfg. Co. v. DeJonge, 179 Pa. Super. 155, 115 A.2d
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
837 (1955).
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One important change wrought by the Code with respect to the buyer's
reliance on the seller is the abrogation of the trade name exception. 6 4
Under the Sales Act a contract to sell or a sale of a specific article
under its patent or trade name usually precluded the buyer's assertion
of reliance on the seller's skill and judgment in selecting goods suitable
for the buyer's purposes. 165 This factor, however, was not material to
the general warranty of merchantability. 16 , The Code has relaxed this
rigid, formalistic approach by providing that the fact that the product
was sold under its patent or trade name is but one factor added to the
167
calculus of buyer reliance and hence is not conclusive on the issue.
With regard to either implied warranty there are two additional
prerequisites to obtain recovery. First, a plaintiff must prove that the
breach occurred at the time of the sale. For example, the seller was
granted a directed verdict after the buyer failed to demonstrate that a
lawnmower was unmerchantable at the time of its delivery, since there
was convincing evidence that the allegedly defective lawnmower operated
satisfactorily for a year prior to the injury. 168 Second, the buyer must
prove that the breach of warranty proximately caused his injury.'1 9
Therefore, the seller may avoid liability by showing that the injury emanated from some superseding cause as where the buyer's injury is caused
by his own failure to discover apparent defects during his inspection. 170
B.
1.

Avoidance of Warranty Liability

The Disclaimer

One method of obviating warranty obligations, express or implied, is
to disclaim them. However, it is not usually economically feasible to exclude all warranties because without certain minimum assurances the buyer
may be too reluctant to buy.
The Sales Act provided that modifications of the various implied
obligations could be achieved by an express agreement or by necessary
164. See note 145 supra.
165. Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Pa. Laws 543, § 15(4); Matteson v. Lagace,
36 R.I. 223, 89 A. 713 (1914). But see Green Mountain Mushroom Co. v. Brown, 117
Vt. 509, 95 A.2d 679 (1953).
166. See, e.g., Frantz Equip. Co. v. Leo Butler Co., 370 Pa. 459, 88 A.2d 702
(1952) ; Tinius Olsen Testing Mach. Co. v. Wolf Co., 297 Pa. 153, 146 A. 541 (1929)
Eimco Corp. v. Joseph Lombardi & Sons, 193 Pa. Super. 1, 162 A.2d 263 (1960)
Demos Constr. Co. v. Service Supply Corp., 153 Pa. Super. 623, 34 A.2d 828 (1943)
Hartford Battery Sales Corp. v. Price, 119 Pa. Super. 165, 181 A. 95 (1935)
Sebastianelli v. Frank, 108 Pa. Super. 550, 165 A. 664 (1933).
167. See Frantz Equip. Co. v. Leo Butler Co., 370 Pa. 459, 88 A.2d 702 (1952)
Knapp v. Willys-Ardmore, Inc., 174 Pa. Super. 90, 100 A.2d 105 (1953).
Both buyer reliance and the seller's reasonable awareness of the buyer's
particular purpose in making the purchase are questions of fact. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
Coog § 2-315, Comment 5; see Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 159
(C.P. Luzerne County 1961). But cf. McMeekin v. Gimbel Bros., 223 F. Supp. 896,
899 n.7 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
168. McMeekin v. Gimbel Bros., 223 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
169. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-715(2) (b) (Supp. 1967).
170. See Pantano v. Zamer Motor Sales Co., 170 Pa. Super. 317, 85 A.2d
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
681 (1952).
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implication. 71' The courts, however, did not look favorably upon disclaimers and tended to construe them strictly. 72 Therefore, in one case,
a seller's contention that all implied warranties were excluded by a contract provision which declared that the written contract encompassed the
entire agreement fell on deaf ears. The court maintained that because
implied warranties import independent obligations, they could be negated
only by express agreement or by those express warranties which by necessary implication wholly incorporated the implied ones. 1 73
The Uniform Commercial Code also permits the seller to disclaim
implied warranties within certain guidelines set forth in section 2-316."4
That section provides that the implied warranty of merchantability may
be excluded or modified orally, but that a disclaimer of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may only be disclaimed by a
writing. If a party asserts disclaimers of either or both warranties in a
17
writing, the language excluding the warranties must be conspicuous. 5
With respect to the implied warranty of merchantability, whether the disclaimer is oral or written the word "merchantability" must be mentioned. 17
Despite the aforementioned Code provisions which set forth strict requirements in order to establish disclaimers, section 2-316(3) 1 77 stipulates
other ways in which warranties may be excluded. Where the contract of
sale includes language such as "with all faults" or "as is" or similar language
which clearly gives notice to a buyer that the seller is making no implied
warranties, all implied warranties are excluded. Moreover, if before entering a contract of sale a buyer either refused to examine a sample or model
or examined it as fully as he desired, no implied warranties exist with
regard to defects that would have been revealed by inspection. Finally,
implied warranties may be excluded or modified by course of dealing,
7
course of performance, or usage of trade.1

An example of the application of the conspicuousness criterion is
Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley179 where the seller asserted a disclaimer,
171. Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Pa. Laws 543, § 71.
172. E.g., Elliot-Lewis Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 372 Pa. 346, 94 A.2d 47
(1953); cf. Boyd v. Smith, 372 Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953) (exculpatory clause
in a lease).
173. Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d
202 (1954).
174. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-316 (Supp. 1967).
175. Under the Code "conspicuous" is defined as:
A term or clause . . . when it is so written that a reasonable person against

whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. . . . Language in the body of
a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color ...
Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for decision by the court.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(10) (Supp. 1967). See Boeing Airplane Co. v.
O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964) (applying Pennsylvania law); accord, S.F.C.
Acceptance Corp. v. Feree, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 225 (C.P. York County 1966).
176. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-316(2) (Supp. 1967).
177. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-316(3) (Supp. 1967); see Kalodis v. Mayo
Motors, Inc., 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 102 (C.P. Lehigh County 1963).
178. In a situation where the buyer knows that in a particular industry warranties
ordinarily do not attach by common usage and he nevertheless enters into a contract,
he effectively
assents
to thatCharles
industrial
custom.
Published
by Villanova
University
Widger
School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
179. 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964) (applying Pennsylvania law).
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incorporated into the sales contract, as a defense to buyer's warranty
action. The court held the disclaimer insufficient since it was neither
in larger nor in a contrasting type or color. Undeniably, today's consumer
is afforded much broader protection than he was under the Sales Act
which demanded nothing comparable to the Code's language and conspicuousness criteria. The criteria to disclaim contemplate objective standards.
The Code's requirement of objectivity in evaluating disclaimers is desirable
since it affords the interested parties a greater degree of certainty, and
thereby assures them that their acts will have the legal consequences sought.
Rather than limiting the extent of his warranty obligation, the seller
may seek to reduce his liability by restricting the buyer to a remedy of
the seller's choosing.'8 0 The Sales Act required that a modification of a
remedy be by express agreement. 81 The courts, however, interpreted such
8 2
agreemebts most narrowly, especially in cases involving personal injury.
The Uniform Commercial Code likewise permits the seller to limit
remedies available to the buyer for breach of a warranty. 83 The pertinent
sections are 2-718(1) and 2-719.184 The latter provides:
[1] (a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to
or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or
alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by
limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment
of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods
or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the
remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the
sole remedy.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where
the loss is commercial is not.
Theoretically, under the Sales Act the buyer was fully competent
to contract away his remedy with no discernable distinction between personal injury, consequential damages, and commercial loss. The Code has
constructed such distinctions by freely allowing restrictions on remedies
180. See PA. STAT. ANN.

tit.

12A, § 2-316(4) (Supp. 1967).

181. Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Pa. Laws 543, § 71; see Sharples Separator Co.
v. Domestic Elec. Refrigerator Corp. ex rel. Holmes Prods., Inc., 61 F.2d 499 (3d
Cir. 1932) ; Bechtold v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 321 Pa. 423, 63 A.2d 397 (1936).
182. See, e.g., Ebbert v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938)
(trespass action).
183. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-316(4) (Supp. 1967) provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but
only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual
harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience
or non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
184. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 2-718(1), -719 (Supp. 1967).
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with respect to commercial and property loss, l8s while treating limitation
of remedies for personal injury in the case of consumer goods as prima
facie unconscionable.18 6 However, this presents an anomalous situation.
Whereas the Code has developed a mechanism which enables the seller
to disclaim all warranties and thereby elude all liability, it nevertheless
curiously stipulates that attempts to limit liability by limiting the remedy
will be labeled prima facie unconscionable in personal injury cases involving consumer goods. Accordingly, the courts should read disclaimers
insuch cases as prima facie unconscionable. Furthermore, this alternative
right of the seller to limit the remedy is barren of requirements such as
conspicuousness which the Code mandates in the case of disclaimers.
One lower court, however, has held that where the seller attempted to
limit the buyer's remedy by contractual provision, conspicuousness was a
manifestly necessary condition, inherent in the concept of excluding or
limiting warranty liability. Therefore, it refused to enforce the contrac87

tual remedy.1

In addition to directly disclaiming the responsibility to supply reasonably fit merchandise, some sellers have sought to accomplish the same
result by disclaiming their obligations in a security agreement executed
subsequently to the contract of sale. The Code has foreclosed this possibility by providing that "[w] hen a seller retains a purchase money security
interest in goods the Article on Sales (Article 2) governs the sale and
any disclaimer, limitation or modification of the seller's warranties.'1 8
Another means of excluding the implied warranty of merchantability
arises When an express warranty is so inclusive that it necessarily negates
any additional implied obligations with respect to general quality assurances. In one pre-Code case, where the seller's warranty of his material
was so embracing, the Pennsylvania supreme court felt bound to deny the
existence of an implied warranty of merchantability which would have
otherwise arisen from the transactionl.' 9 The Code has substantially enacted the holding of this case into positive law. Section 2-317(c) declares
that "[e]xpress warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other
than an implied warranty of fitness. . .

."

The Code provision that the

warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is not displaced by an inconsistent express warranty is sound, since the warranty of fitness should not
be engulfed by an express warranty which ordinarily would not be
inapposite to it.190
185. See Magar v. Lifetime, Inc., 187 Pa. Super. 143, 144 A.2d 747 (1958).
186. If the restriction is unconscionable, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-302 (Supp.
1967) is controlling.
187. Warminster Township Municipal Authority ex rel. Robinson Clay Prod. Co.
v. Berlanti Constr. Co., 13 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 527 (C.P. Bucks County 1964).
188. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-206(2) (Supp. 1967). E.g., L. & N. Sales Co.
v. Stoski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958).
189. See, e.g., Tate-Jones & Co. v. Union Elec. Steel Co., 281 Pa. 448, 126 A.
813 (1924).
2
190.by Villanova
See PA. University
STAT. ANN.
tit, Widger
12A, § School
-317(c)
See1968
also L. & N.
Published
Charles
of Law(Supp.
Digital 1966).
Repository,
Sales Co. v. Stoski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958).
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Privity

Well before the sophistication of warranty law, the landmark decision
of Winterbottom v. Wright'" was widely regarded as authority that
neither a manufacturer nor a wholesaler was liable to a remote purchaser
absent privity between the parties. Although the 1916 case of MacPhersov
v. Buick Motor Co.' 92 eliminated the requirement of privity in torts,
it is still a necessity in actions based on breach of warranty. Although
the attack on the traditional defense of privity has proceeded swiftly,' 93
19 4
the siege has not been unqualifiedly successful.
In Pennsylvania, attempts to ease the privity requirement, which had
begun under the Sales Act, were effectuated very slowly. 19 5 Only purchasers were granted warranty protection, 90 and they could only sue
remote manufacturers in cases involving injuries resulting from impure
food or a breach of an express warranty. These cases were considered
exceptions to the traditional rule that purchasers received warranties only
from their immediate sellers.
With respect to the express warranty exception, the situation often
arises that the consumer, relying on the manufacturer's promises, purchases the advertised, though defective, product and is injured. 97 In
these situations, the courts have not hesitated to impose liability on the
distant manufacturer for breaching its express warranty.198 The reason
advanced for dispensing with privity is that the remote vendor contemplates that its extensive advertising will become part of the consideration
given for the ultimate sale.' 99 Therefore, when a cigarette smoking cancer
victim charged Liggett & Myers with breaching its express warranties,
want of vertical privity did not determine the result.20 0 The impure food
191. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
192. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) ; see pp. 795-97 supra. See generally 1 L.
FRUMMER & M. FREIDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.02 (1967).
193. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960)
Prosser, The Face of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
194. See Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966) ; Hochgertel v. Canada
Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
195. Under the Sales Act only a buyer could sue, and only the immediate seller
could be sued. Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391 (3d Cir.
1932). However, the pre-Code courts sometimes resorted to legal ploys to circumvent the rule. Thus, an injured spouse recovered where the court found that the
product was purchased by the other spouse as agent for him. See also Bonenberger v.
Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1943).
196. See Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
197. Jaeger, supra note 122, at 141; Bailey, supra note 146, at 296; see Wilson v.
American Chain & Cable Co., 216 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
198. E.g., cases cited in note 124 supra.
199. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 616, 187 A.2d 575, 578 (1963)
cf. Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953).
200. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966). The assurances given and relied on included:
"Chesterfields are best for you"; "Nose, Throat And Accessory Organs Not Adversely
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
Affected By Smoking Chesterfields." Id. at 482.
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exception, on the other hand, is based on strong policy considerations to
2 °1
impose a higher standard on manufacturers of food products.
With the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, the attack
on privity was revitalized. By expanding the benefits of any warranty
beyond the buyer to "any natural person who is in [his] family or household" or to "a guest in his home," 202 the Uniform Commercial Code
overcame the traditional privity concept that only parties to the sales
contract may enforce the warranties attached thereto against the immediate
seller. Corresponding to this expansion of the lateral coverage of a warranty under the Code, the courts also tended to allow remote purchasers
203
to recover against manufacturers.
To determine the present status of the privity issue in Pennsylvania,
it must be noted that the strictures of privity operate in two distinct directions, horizontally and vertically. Horizontal privity refers to the
breadth of coverage of the seller's warranty. In other words, this concept
would determine whether there were any beneficiaries of the warranty,
in addition to the buyer, who could sue the seller if they were injured by
the product. Vertical privity, on the other hand, focuses on whether the
original seller's warranties extend to remote purchasers through the distributive chain. This concept would be dispositive of whether a consumer
could sue the wholesaler under warranties made by the latter, notwithstanding a transaction with an intervening retailer.
The position of the privity question in Pennsylvania depends on the
interaction of the Code with the courts' view of the legislative intent in
its enactment. The scope of horizontal privity rests upon judicial construction of section 2-318 and whether the courts find any case law granting wider rights. With respect to vertical privity, section 2-318 makes no
provision. Consequently, whether a remote purchaser may sue the manufacturer in warranty depends on case law.
In order to determine the present status of both the vertical and
horizontal privity requirements, the cases of Hochgertel v. Canada Dry
Corp.,20 4 Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co.,20 5 and Miller v. PreitZ,20

will be

discussed at length.
201. E.g., Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964) ; Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
202. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (Supp. 1967).
203. Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rcv'd on
other grounds, 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963) ; cf. Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp.
120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568
(1959).
204. 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), noted in 67 DICK. L. REv. 428 (1963),
51 Gpo. L.J. 860 (1963), 25 U. PIr. L. REv. 99 (1963), 49 VA. L. REv. 1040 (1963),
and 65 W. VA. L. REV. 326 (1963). But cf. Childs v. Austin Supply Co., 408 Pa. 403,
184 A.2d 250 (1962).
205. 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964), noted in 17 ALA. L. Riv. 92 (1964), 14
CATHOLIC U.L. Rv.133 (1965), 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 177 (1964); 48 MARQ. L.R v.
273 (1964), 25 MD.L.Rv.80 (1965), 17 VAND. L.Rv.1537 (1964), and 10 VILL.L.
REv. 607 (1965).
206. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966), noted in 33 BROOKLYN L.REv. 334 (1967),
16 DRAKE L. Rev. 115 (1967), 15 KAN. L. Rv.219 (1966), 43 N.D.L. REv. 560
(1967),
N.Y.L.F.
530 (1966),
VAND.
L.REv.
665Digital
(1967),Repository,
and 8 WM.
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1968& MARY L.
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In Hochgertel, an employee tending bar in his employer's clubhouse
was injured by glass fragments from a bottle of carbonated soda water,
which exploded while standing on the counter behind the bar. The bartender sued the manufacturer, although the employer had bought the
bottle. In dismissing the employee's claim the court found the lack of
horizontal privity decisive. Speaking for the court., Justice Eagen
declared:
It is clear from the language used [UCC 2-318] that in order
to qualify as a person (not a buyer), who is within the protection of
the warranty, one must be a member of the buyer's family, his household or a guest in his home. An employee is definitely in none of
these categories. 207
The court, noting that "the code was not intended to restrict the case law
in this field," 20 also considered the exception to the requirement of
privity granted in food and beverage cases. After reviewing such cases,
the court noted that in no case had recovery "against the manufacturer
for breach of an implied warranty been extended beyond a purchaser in
'20 9
the distributive chain.
The court, in dictum, was terse on the issue of vertical privity. It
declared that exclusive of food cases, since an implied warranty of
merchantability does not survive a resale, the only recourse in warrant),
available to an injured party who qualifies as a section 2-318 beneficiary
is against his immediate vendor.2 10 Since the Code offers no positive
solution to the vertical privity problem, the court relied on policy to support its dictum. The court thus concluded that an extension of the warranty up the distributive chain would convert the manufacturer into a
guarantor, a result too harsh and unjust to be palatable. 21' This result
also follows from the traditional distinctions between contract and tort.
The horizontal aspects of privity were reviewed in Yentzer v. Taylor
Wine Co., 212 a case which corresponds closely to Hochgertel. On behalf
on his employer, a hotel manager personally bought four bottles of champagne produced by the defendant. The manager and other employees
were preparing to serve the champagne when a cap from one of the bottles
suddenly ejected, hitting the manager in the eye. When the injured employee brought an action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability,
the lower court held that Hochgertel controlled and dismissed his suit.
The Pennsylvania supreme court reversed on the ground that the plaintiff
was a buyer. The court said that Hochgertel was not meant to foreclose
207. 409 Pa. at 613, 187 A.2d at 577.
208. Id. at 614, 187 A.2d at 578.
209. Id. at 615, 187 A.2d at 578.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 616, 187 A.2d at 578. But see Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320
(1966) which reached precisely that result on the theory of strict liability in tort.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
212. 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964).

34

Benner et al.: Products Liability in Pennsylvania
SUMMER

1968]

COMMENTS

an actual purchaser from warranty protection, 213 and held that, since
warranties run to buyers and the term "buyer" in section 2-318 is defined
in section 2-103 as "a person who buys or contracts to buy," 214 the
plaintiff was protected.
The third decision, Miller v. Preit, 21 " arose when a defective home

vaporizer killed the purchaser's 7-week-old nephew when it spewed boiling
water over him. The vaporizer was being operated in the decedent's home,
which was next door to the purchaser's. A survival action was begun
against the druggist who sold the item, the distributor, and the manufacturer. The first issue presented was the status of the decedent under
section 2-318 of the Code. By observing that section 2-318 was drafted
in the disjunctive, the court decided that the word "family" was not intended to be restricted to the meaning of "household" or "home. ''21" The
court then had to ascertain whether the decedent came within the term
"family." In meeting this problem the court resorted to policy in declaring:
"[Clonsidering the remedial nature of the provision [section 2-318] and
the natural connotations of the word (family), its meaning was not intended to be unduly restrictive.

'2 17

In finding that the decedent was a family member the court utilized a
test of foreseeability. It answered this factual question in favor of the
decedent noting that the relevant considerations may include "remoteness
of the family relation, the geographical connection between the buyer and
2 18
the member of his family, and the nature of the product."
Once the court held that section 2-318 enabled the survivor to sue,
the vertical privity issue was placed squarely before the court. The court
turned to case law, noting that the vertical privity requirement still has
great vitality in implied warranty actions in Pennsylvania. Since the

213. Compare Kaczmarkiewicz v. J.P. Williams Co., 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 14 (C.P.
Allegheny County 1957) where an injured employee was likewise awarded a recovery
on the basis that he, although not the buyer, was a member of his family, with
Wolovitz v. Falco Prods. Co., 111 P.L.J. 185 (C.P. Allegheny County 1963) which
denied recovery because the injured person was a guest not in the home of the buyer
but in the home of the buyer's donee. Cf. Facciolo Paving & Constr. Co. v. Road
Mach., Inc., 8 Chest. 375 (C.P. Chester County 1958) which held that because the
plaintiff corporation was not a natural person it was not encompassed by section 2-318,
and therefore, could not enforce its predecessor's warranty rights.
214. 414 Pa. at 275, 199 A.2d at 465.
215. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
216. 422 Pa. at 389, 221 A.2d at 323.
217. Id. at 390, 221 A.2d at 323.
218. Id. See Marcus v. Spada Bros. Auto Serv., 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 794 (C.P. Philadelphia County 1967) where the court was faced with the analogous task of defining
"guest in his home." There, the guest's injury could be traced to defective tires purchased by the host. However, since the plaintiff was a guest in the buyer's automobile
rather than in his home, the court sustained the seller's demurrer based on want of
privity. In light of the foreseeability test of Miller which considers the nature of the
product as an operative fact, it is submitted that Spada Bros. was incorrectly decided;
for where else would a buyer's guest be injured when the defective product is an automobile tire? Or, is it only that the word "family" was not intended to be unduly
restrictive?
See p.University
826 supra.
Published
by Villanova
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
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child was not a purchaser, and this was not an impure food case, the court
sustained the demurrers of the distributor and manufacturer, referring to
dictum in Hochgertel. The Miller holding is the final pronouncement on
the vertical privity question in the warranty field. It appears very strongly
that the supreme court is going to maintain the distinction between an
action based on tort and one based on contract, since on the same day it
decided Miller the court adopted as law in Pennsylvania section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts in Webb v. Zern.219
In summary, the status of the law in Pennsylvania as to privity seems
clear. Absolutely no one, other than a buyer and the other beneficiaries
enumerated in section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code may maintain a warranty action. Yentzer indicates that contrary to what might be
expected, the buyer (the person who made the actual transaction) will
be covered by section 2-318 even if lie is acting as an agent and obtains
no title to the goods. The limits of the family provision and the foreseeability test will have to be determined in future cases. As to vertical privity,
no one may be sued unless he is in privity with the buyer except in the
well -established impure food cases and certain express warranty situations.
3.

Defenses
2
22
Unlike the common law, the Code 0 requires, as did the Sales Act, 2'

that the buyer give notice to the seller of any breach of warranty within
a reasonable time after the buyer should have discovered the breach. A
failure to do so bars any remedy. The purpose of the notice requirement is to "defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy.

' '222

Under the Sales Act the courts' focus in applying the notice provision
shifted from whether the buyer was guilty of laches 223 to whether the seller

was prejudiced by the delayed notification. 224 Compliance with the notice
requirement was not legally sufficient, however, unless the notice was clear
and unambiguous. To comply, the buyer was required not only to isolate
219. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
220. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-607(3) (a) (Supp. 1967):
(3) Where tender has been accepted
(a) a buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred
from any remedy . . . (emphasis added).
221. Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Pa. Laws 543, § 49:
[11f . . . the buyer fail[s] to give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise
or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know
of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor.
222. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607, Comment 4.
223. Kull v. General Motors Truck Co., 311 Pa. 580, 166 A. 562 (1933).
224. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 1961)
Bonker v. Ingersoll Prod. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5, 6 (D. Mass 1955) (applying Pennsylvania law). But see Necho Coal Co. v. Denise Coal Co., 387 Pa. 567, 128 A.2d
771 (1957); General Foods Corp. v. Bittinger, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 282 (C.P. York
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
County 1963).
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the specific defects with reasonable particularity but also to indicate
225

whether consequential damages were being claimed.
Cognizant of the case law which had evolved under the Sales Act
perverting the notice concept, the Code draftsmen have endeavored in the
official commentary to guide the courts in applying the notice provision.
The commentary states:
The time of notification is to be determined by applying commercial standards to a merchant buyer. "A reasonable time" for notification from a retail consumer is to be judged by different standards
so that in his case it will be extended....
The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let
the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be
watched. There is no reason to require that the notification which
saves the buyer's rights under this section must include a clear statement of all the objections that will be relied on by the buyer .... Nor
is there reason for requiring the notification to be a claim for damages
or of any threatened litigation or other resort to a remedy. The notification which saves the buyer's rights under this Article need only
be such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach,
and thus opens the way for normal settlement through
226
negotiation.
Perhaps inspired by the comments, the Pennsylvania courts no longer
*demand unrealistic formality to comply with the notice rule. 227 It was
held recently that the plaintiff had satisfied the technical requirements by
submitting periodic progress reports which plainly evidenced that the
goods in question were not performing as warranted. 22 s Similarly, in a
case involving a malfunctioning helicopter, the fact that the seller's representative participated in efforts to rectify the faulty equipment was deemed
22 9
sufficient to meet the notice requirement.
The liberal approach of the Code and of the Pennsylvania courts to the
notice requirement has severely circumscribed the defense of unreasonable
delay in notification. Nevertheless, the buyer and seller may agree as to
what constitutes a reasonable time within which notice must be given by
making such a provision in their sales contract. 23 0 However, the Code
does limit the parties' freedom in this regard: "Whenever this Act requires
any action to be taken within a reasonable time, any time which is not
manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement." 231 Consequently,
225. See Texas Motorcoaches, Inc. v. A.C.F. Motors Co., 154 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir.
1946); C.D. Brown & Co. v. Standard Hide Co., 301 Pa. 543, 552, 157 A. 557, 559-60
(1930) ; Aaron Bodek & Son v. Avrach, 297 Pa. 225, 146 A. 546 (1929).
226. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607, Comment 4.
227. See Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964) (applying
Pennsylvania law) ; National Container Corp. v. Regal Corrugated Box Co., 383 Pa.
494, 119 A.2d 270 (1956).
228. Babcock Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Shook, 204 Pa. Super. 141, 203 A.2d
399 (1964).
229. Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964) (applying
Pennsylvania law).
230.by Villanova
See PA. University
STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A,
§ 1-204(1)
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where a buyer commenced an action to recover for breach of the implied
warranties, which breach could not have been detected within the agreed
upon time limit, the court held that, under these circumstances, the agreed
232
upon time was manifestly unreasonable.
A second defense available is the statute of limitations. The Sales
Act made no provision limiting the time within which actions could be
brought, and thus the courts had to resort to state statutes to determine
whether an action was barred. In Pennsylvania the pertinent statutes set
forth a 6-year limit on contract actions 233 and a 2 -year limit for personal injury suits.

23 4

In the past the latter statute has been construed as

controlling an assumpsit action for personal injuries resulting from breach
of warranty. 233 The Code, however, provides a 4-year statute of limitations
which begins to run at tender of delivery. 236 In Gardiner v. Philadelphia.
Gas Works, 237 the court was faced with the question whether to apply the

2-year personal injury or 4-year Code statute of limitations to warranty
actions brought for personal injury. The court held, where plaintiffs
brought their action more than 2 years after their injuries were incurred
but less than 4 from tender of delivery, that the 4-year limit was applicable. The court based its holding on the Pennsylvania Bar Notes to
section 2-725 which state that the 4-year period under the Code changes
the prior law concerning assumpsit actions for personal injury. 23 8 The
language of the Code and the reasoning used in Gardiner v. Philadelphia
Gas Works also lead to the conclusion that in warranty actions for property
damage the Code statute of limitations supersedes the 6-year statute for
contract actions.
With respect to other possible defenses it should be noted that the defense of contributory negligence is not available in an action in assumpsit. 23 9
232. Vandenberg & Sons v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964) ; cf.
Truscon Steel Co. v. Fuhrman & Schmidt Brewing Co., 327 Pa. 10, 192 A. 679 (1937).
233. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953).
234. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
235. Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc., 355 Pa. 242, 49 A.2d 379 (1946). But see Ravetz
v. Upjohn Co., 138 F. Supp. 66, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1955) which decided that whichever
limitation comes first precludes an assumpsit action for personal injury.
236. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-725(1) (Supp. 1967):
An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four
years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the
parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may
not extend it.
Section 2-725 (2) provides:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender
of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future
performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such
performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have
been discovered.
Under this provision, where a complaint in assumpsit for breach of implied warranties
was filed more than 4 years after the purchase of the goods, the action was barred,
even though the defect was not discovered for over 1 year from the time of purchase.
Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965).
237. 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
238. Id. at 614.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
239. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 431, 156 A.2d 568, 574 (1960)
see Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946); cf. Robert H. Carr &
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In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. 240 stated that assumption of risk, in the

sense of contributory negligence, would likewise not bar recovery in an
action for breach of warranty, since both defenses sound in tort rather
than contract. With regard to assumption of risk, however, the court
went on to hold that "[i]f a consumer uses a product for a purpose not
intended by the manufacturer and suffers an injury as a result, he may not
recover because such misuse is beyond the scope of the warranty .... -241

Thus, in assumpsit actions the defense of assumption of risk, in the sense
of misuse of the product, will be available. Similarly, where a person is
injured by his failure to detect apparent imperfections in purchased goods,
recovery may be denied. 242 In general, the enunciated rule 243 on lack of
diligence is that of the Restatement of Contracts section 336: "Damages
are not recoverable for harm that the plaintiff should have foreseen and
could have avoided by reasonable effort without undue risk, expense,
or humiliation."
Finally, recovery will be denied in situations in which a party sustains
injury as a result of his own peculiar susceptibilities rather than the
product's defective nature. In one case, for example, a woman who developed a skin condition after wearing a dress was denied recovery when
it was shown that the injury was a result of her unique allergy to a
substance in the fabric rather than the defective condition in the material. 244

IV.

STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT

A.

Introduction

In the recent case of Webb v. Zern245 the Pennsylvania supreme court

adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and thereby
introduced into Pennsylvania law a new concept of products liability.
Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
Sons v. Yearsley, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 262 (C.P. Chester County 1963). See generally
Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965).
240. 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 987 (1966).
241. Id. at 485.

242. Pantano v. Zaner Motor Sales Co., 170 Pa. Super. 317, 85 A.2d 681 (1952)
cf. Farrey's, Inc. v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 103 F. Supp. 488, 491 (E.D.
Pa. 1952).
243. Announced in Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 431, 156 A.2d

568, 574 (1960); cf. S.F.C. Acceptance Corp. v. Feree, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 225 (C.P.
York County 1966).
244. byBarrett
v. University
S.S. Kresge
Co.,Widger
144 Pa.
Super.
516,Digital
19 A.2d
502 (1941).
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Charles
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Repository,
1968
245. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
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to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumner, or to his property, if
(a)

the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it
is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
What course Pennsylvania will follow in applying this recently adopted
doctrine is not clear.246 Therefore, in order to gain some insight into
how Pennsylvania courts will resolve these problems, it becomes necessary
to examine the positions taken by other jurisdictions on problems similar
to those which will surely arise in Pennsylvania courts. It is the purpose of
this section to examine the doctrine of strict liability in tort as it has been
applied by a number of courts, and to present arguments and considerations germane to such liability in areas which, at present, are unsettled.
B.

History

It is the general consensus of opinion24 17 that the genesis of the theory
of strict liability in tort for defectively manufactured products is found in
those cases where the plaintiff was injured as a result of impure food and,
notwithstanding lack of privity, was allowed to recover against the manufacturer. In order to effectuate a policy of protecting consumers from
such hazards,248 the courts "labored hard to evolve a great many highly
ingenious theories"2 9 to circumvent the problems of privity historically
25 0
inherent in sales transactions..

246. The Pennsylvania supreme court has decided three cases dealing with strict
liability in tort: Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968) ; Ferraro
v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966) ; Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424,
220 A.2d 853 (1966).

A fourth Pennsylvania case granting recovery in strict liability in tort was
recently decided by the Court of Common Pleas for Allegheny County, Bartkewich v.
Billinger, No. 1311 (C.P. Allegheny County, Oct. 9, 1967).
247. E.g., Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103-10
(1960) ; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9,
10-13 (1966).
248. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1104-06
(1960).
249. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1106 (1960). For
an array of these theories see Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L.
REv. 119, 153-55 (1958).
250. For the most current listing of the jurisdictions allowing recovery directly
against the manufacturer for injuries resulting from the use of impure foods see
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 15
n.40 (1966).
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When Pennsylvania first considered the liability of the manufacturer
for injuries resulting from the sale of impure foods 25 1 it premised liability
on breach of the Pennsylvania Pure Food Statute ;252 it was not until

sometime later 25 3 that it based liability on the general policy considerations
advanced by other courts. 25 4 The first case in Pennsylvania extending
liability to the manufacturer for defective products other than food was
Elkins, Bly & Co. v. McKean, 25 5 where a manufacturer of oil was held
liable to a remote purchaser for injuries which resulted when the oil
exploded. A second Pennsylvania case which allowed a purchaser to
recover from a manufacturer was Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke.21

In

that case the court found an express warranty of quality on the basis of a
tag attached to the tobacco purchased by the plaintiff.
The leading case granting recovery to a remote buyer without proof
of negligence or breach of an express warranty was Spence v. Three
2 7
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.y,
where, in an action based on
breach of an implied warranty, the Michigan supreme court granted recovery. for damages resulting from defective cinderblocks made by the
defendant. Similar results were reached in the cases of Thompson v.
Reedman Motors25 and Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co. 25 9 where the manu-

facturers were held liable for injuries resulting from manufacturing defects
in their automobiles. In these cases, the courts considered the requirement of privity in implied warranty actions to be on the wane in Pennsylvania as a result of Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 260 where the plaintiff

was found to have stated a cause of action against the manufacturer for
property damages resulting from the defective condition of a truck.
Although the authority of these decisions is questionable, 2 1 it seems clear
that the courts were imposing a form of strict liability in tort while using

the historic terms of warranty

62

and, as such, the decisions may give

251. Whether a foodstuff is considered impure will depend on whether the foreign
material may be expected to be found therein. See Bonnenberger v. Pittsburgh
Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942).
252. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
31, §§ 1-984 (1958). See, e.g., Catani v. Swift & Co.,
251 Pa. 52, 95 A. 931 (1915) ;Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515,
156 A. 537 (1931).
253. See, e.g., Caskie v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953);
Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 147 Pa. Super. 39, 23 A.2d 342 (1941).
254. E.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
255. 79 Pa. 493 (1875).
256. 144 Pa. 159, 22 A.868 (1891).
InMcCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v.Nicholson, 17 Pa. Super. 188 (1901),
the court granted recovery to the purchaser of a defective rope for the full purchase
price, notwithstanding the fact that he was not in privity with the manufacturer, on
the basis of an express warranty made by the sales agents of the manufacturer.
257. 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
258. 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961), modified, 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963).
259. 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
260. 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
261. See Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 392 n.7, 221 A.2d 320, 325 n.7 (1966)
pp. 825-28 supra.
262. In Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965), the
court in characterizing strict liability in tort said:
Without attempting an exhaustive explanation, it may fairly be said that the
liability
which this
section
wouldWidger
impose
is hardly
what 1968
exists under
Published
by Villanova
University
Charles
School
of Law more
Digital than
Repository,

41

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1968], Art. 10
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13

some indication of the result of an action brought on similar facts under
section 402A.
In 1963 the California supreme court, following the suggestions of
Dean Prosser, 263 completely disassociated the liability imposed upon manufacturers for personal injuries resulting from defective products from any
contractual principles, and imposed liability as a matter of policy sounding
wholly in tort. 264 The effect that this decision has had on the law of
products liability was probably best expressed by Dean Wade when he
said: "[I]f you look only to the authorities rendered in the last four or
five years [which favor strict tort liability over contractual liability], the
result is not just decisive, it is overwhelming .... -265
Strict liability in tort is generally predicated upon two propositions:
1) such liability is properly allocable as a cost of maintaining enterprises which, although beneficial to the general public, inevitably
present risks to human life and limb ;266

2) the presence of a product on the market is a representation to
said product may be safely used for its intended
the user 2 that
67
purposes.
Courts have, for the most part, utilized both propositions in adopting strict
liability in tort, 268 and in the majority of cases it will make little difference
which policy is adopted. 269 However, it is clear that the policy origins of
strict liability in tort are quite broad, and there is no clear limitation on
the liability which may be imposed on the economic chain. Therefore, the
courts are presented with a vast area of new tort liability to which they
must give form and substance.
implied warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer,
requirements of notice of defect, and limitations through inconsistencies with
express warranties.
263. In Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960),
it was submitted: "If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability
in tort, declared outright, without an illusory contract mask."
264. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
265. Wade, Recent Developments in the Law of Strict Liability for Products,
33 INS. COUNSEL J. 552, 553 (1966). See Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer
in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 14-15 & n.39 (1966).
266. James, General Products - Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REv. 923 (1957). See also Prosser, Strict Liability to the
Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 19-20 (1966) and cases cited in note
267 infra.
267. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) ; Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965) ; State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 912 (1967) ; Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
268. See cases cited in note 267 supra; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer
in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 19-20 (1966).
269. The only area where the use of one or the other of these two theories of
recovery might be of significance is in the injured bystander situation. See pp. 843-44
infra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
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C. The Cause of Action
In Pennsylvania an action 270 brought under 402A against everyone in
the chain of distribution 2 7 1 for injuries resulting from the normal use 272
of the product will require the plaintiff to prove:
1) that the product was both defective and unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer ;273
2) that said defect caused the plaintiff's injury;
3) that the defendant in some way participated in placing the product
274
on the market for the plaintiff's use or consumption.
There is no need to prove that the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer

was negligent. 275 Moreover, the plaintiff is not required to give notice of
injury to such defendants or show that he relied on any representations
made by the parties in the economic chain. 276 In addition, strict liability

in tort cannot be disclaimed.
More importantly, it is not necessary that the injured user or consumer prove that he acquired the product by a sale. 277 In fact, in light of

the Delaney v. Towmotor Corp.278 and Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing
& Rental Serv.2 79 decisions it is not even necessary to prove that there
270. Normally, a suit in trespass will be instituted by joining all those parties in

the economic chain who are amenable to service of process. E.g., Ferraro v. Ford
Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966) ; Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d

853 (1966).

271. The distributive chain will include all those parties which were directly
responsible for placing the product on the market. It "applies to any manufacturer
of such a product, to any wholesaler or retail dealer or distributor.. . ." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) o1' TORTS § 402A, comment f at 350 (1965).
272. It is not clear at this stage of the development of strict liability whether the
plaintiff must prove that he was using the product in its intended fashion or whether
misuse is a defense which the defendant has the burden of proving. See pp. 848-49 infra.
273. In Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co., Civil Nos. 64-976, 65-317 (W.D. Pa.,
Dec. 26, 1967), in denying the defendant's motion for a judgment n.o.v., the court
reasoned that the quantum of proof necessary to prove a defect under 402A was
analogous to that required to prove a breach of warranty of fitness, and held that
the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of a defect in the product by showing that
it malfunctioned.
274. In the alternative to a cause of action in strict liability based on 402A,
plaintiff may rely on section 402B in situations where a person is injured as a result
of his reliance on the representations of the seller. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 402B (1965) states:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or
otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning
the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical
harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not maoe fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (a) (1965).
276. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 402A, comment in at 355-56 (1965).
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment I at 354 (1965).
Published
Villanova
278. by339
F.2d 4 University
(2d Cir. Charles
1964). Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
279. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1968], Art. 10

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13

was a sale at anytime. The Delaney court referred to the use of the word
seller in 402A
as a description of the situation that has most commonly arisen rather
than as a deliberate limitation of the principle to cases where the
product has been sold, intentionally excluding instances where a
manufacturer has2 0placed a defective article in the stream of commerce
by other means.
If there is no requirement of a sale, then the next question is whether the
defendant must be "in the business of selling such a product."' 28 ' The
decision in Cintrone holding a bailor for hire liable for injuries resulting
from the defective condition of a leased truck indicates that there is no
such requirement.
An unsettled problem in the area of strict liability is whether a wrongful death action may be premised oi section 402A.282 In Miller v. Preitz
the court dismissed a count in assumpsit for wrongful death stating.that
an "action provided by the 'Wrongful Death' statute could be brought
only in trespass ....,"283 In Webb v. Zern, in which Pennsylvania .adopted
section 402A, the court stated that an action subject to the provisions, of
402A is "explicitly a cause of action in trespass for defective products
liability. '28 4 Thus, it appears that a wrongful death action.brought under
402A will be allowed. However, if the policy behind strict liability for injuries resulting from defective products is to place the costs of such injuries upon those who can allocate the burden to a large group, then,
since the average consumer usually has some protection through life insurance, such costs are thereby prorated among a large group, and the
policy is served. 28 ' Thus, it is arguable that no action for wrongful death
should be permitted.
D.

The Product and its Defect

Comment g of section 402A defines a defective condition as one "not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. '286 Thus, whether a product is defective is determined
by the norm of whether it meets the standards of safety reasonably
expected by the user or consumer. 28 7 It is difficult to delineate what are
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Delaney v. Towrnotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1964).
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (a) (1965) (emphasis added).
Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
422 Pa. 383, 387, 221 A.2d 320, 322 (1966).
422 Pa. 424, 427, 220 A.2d 853, 855 (1966).
Keeton, Recent Decisions and Developments in the Law of Products Liability,

32 INS. COUNSEL J. 620, 632 (1965).
286. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op TORTS

§ 402A, comment g at 351 (1965). Also,
in comment i at 352, it is stated: "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent

beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
287. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 18 (1965),

where it is posited "that the court makes the determination that strict liability will
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reasonable expectations of a consumer; however, to require a manufacturer to make his product completely safe or as safe as it may be made
has been determined to be unreasonable. 28 8 Decisions of the courts indicate that a defective product

28 9

usually is one that functions improperly, 290

is improperly assembled,2 92 or has a weakened part. 293
is adulterated,
In order to state a cause of action against anyone in the economic
chain for injuries resulting from the defective condition of the product,
it must be shown that the defect was unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer and that the defect created the product's unreasonably dangerous condition.29 4 Both the defect and a causal relationship between it
and the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product must be alleged
in the complaint, and both elements must be proved at the trial or recovery
will be denied.
Confusion arises when a defendant manufacturer attempts to rebut
a showing of defect in his product by proving that the product conforms
in all respects to the industry norm. In a situation such as this, it
must be clearly understood that a defect is to be determined by the norm
of whether it meets the standards reasonably expected by the user or consumer and that compliance with an industrial norm would only be some
evidence that it complies with the former standards and is by no means
2 91

295
conclusive on the issue.

What will ultimately be a more burdensome question is whether a
manufacturer has a duty to incorporate a known safety device into his
product, and whether a failure to do so will result in a defectively designed
be applied to products in general" and "will sometimes make the determination for
the kind of product . . . and leave to the jury the question of whether the particular

article involved was reasonably safe" (emphasis added).
288. See, e.g., Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966);

Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 16 (1965).
289. See Freedman, "Defect" in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Products
Liability in Tort and in Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REv. 323 (1966) ; Traynor, The Ways
and Meanings of Defective Productsand Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rzv. 363 (1965).

290. E.g., Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966).
291. E.g., Caskie v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953).
292. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
293. E.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i at 352 (1965). Some
of the considerations which may be used to determine the unreasonably dangerous

nature of the product were stated in Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,

19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965) as:
1) the usefulness and desirability of the product,
2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same needs,
3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness,
4) the obviousness of the danger,
5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger (particularly for established products),

6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the
effect of instructions and warnings), and
7) the ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.
295. See Traynor, note 289 supra, at 370; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS
§ 402A, bycomment
at 351 (1965).
Published
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decided that the manufacturer does not have a duty to make use of new
safety devices as they are discovered, then an anomalous situation is
created. The manufacturer who refuses to incorporate such devices in his
product would not be liable for injuries which would not have occurred
had he used these new devices, 29 7 whereas the manufacturer who does
incorporate such devices may be held liable if they malfunction. Nevertheless, the standard of safety which will reasonably be expected by the
consuming public should keep pace with technological advances, and
what may have been considered a reasonably safe product today may not
be so considered tomorrow. Automobiles present recent case history in
this respect and the current furor over the emission of radiation from
color televisions and x-ray devices may create similar problems for the
298
manufacturer of those products.

It is doubtful, however, whether future business decisions to incorporate safety devices in a product will be influenced by the imposition of
strict liability in tort upon manufacturers as a result of increasingly
stringent consumer expectations.2 9 9 The cost of litigation, judgments, and
insurance will normally not be that significant in relation to other factors3 00
to compel a managerial decision to include or not to include a newly developed safety feature as part of the product. Thus, to impose liability upon
the manufacturer for failure to incorporate a new safety mechanism on the
product would be based on a theory of allocation of the costs of the injury
which the user has incurred rather than on an attempt to force the manufacturer to make a safer product. 301
A defective condition in a product is not limited to the situation where
the manufacturer fails to properly make the product or to incorporate
common safety features. A defect may also arise if the manufacturer fails
to properly warn consumers or users of a reasonably foreseeable danger
inherent in his product's normal use. 30 2 A danger is reasonably fore296. In Bartkewich v. Billinger, No. 1311 (C.P. Allegheny County, Oct. 9, 1967),

the court held that the failure to incorporate a known safety device created a defect

in the design of the product (wire covering over rollers in a glass cutting machine).
See also Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
297. Compare Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) and Wright
v. Massey Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966) with Brown v.
General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966) and Evans v. General Motors
Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).

298. See 114 CONG. R~c. 802 (1968) (remarks of Senator Magnuson).
299. See Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects
in Products - An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. Rzv. 938, 945 (1957) where the
author states: "While it may be conceivable that the imposition of strict liability could
increase in some small measure the pressure upon a few backward manufacturers to
make their products safe, it is doubtful that it will add very much to existing pressures."
300. For example, such factors might be the cost of labor, the cost of retooling his

production line, and impairment of the esthetic appeal of his product to the public.
301. If the desired result is to try to force the manufacturer to make a safer
product, it is best achieved by legislation imposing criminal penalties rather than by
imposition of money judgments.
302. RESTATXMENT (StcoND) op TORTS § 402A, comment j at 353 (1965).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
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839

seeable when the manufacturer knows or should know that the consuming
03
public will be endangered by normal use of his product.A

Thus, the

abnormal user8 04 will not be protected and, similarly, a manufacturer will
not be required to warn against unintended or abnormal uses of his
product.30 5 When a warning is required, it must be clearly and adequately
30
given or it will be treated in the same manner as if no warning were given.
A unique group of products which, because of the current state of
knowledge, cannot be made safer and pose significant danger to the user
or consumer, requires a different approach to determine whether such
products are defective. 30 7 Products grouped under this classification would
include blood and certain drugs and other products intended for internal
use such as an anesthetic. These products are set apart from others as a
result of a policy determination that the benefit which may be derived from
their use overshadows the inherent risk of harm to the user. 308 However,
even if these products are classified as "reasonably" dangerous, they must
meet a standard of safety which is far higher than that imposed upon
manufacturers of safer products. The duty of the manufacturer in this
situation is to know of any and all possible means of making his product
safer, whereas the manufacturer of other products is only required to meet
the reasonable expectations of the consumer or user in order to avoid
creating an unreasonably dangerous product. 30 9
Another problem related to the issue of defects concerns the point in
time when the defect exists. Comment g to section 402A of the Restatement states that that section will impose liability upon a seller3 10 only if
the plaintiff can prove that the defective condition existed at the time it
12
left the seller's hands. 31' However, in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,
the California supreme court ruled that if the manufacturer delegates a
part of the manufacturing process to an intermediate or retail seller, he
will not avoid liability if that person's failure to perform the delegated
function results in a defective condition. Subsequently, in the case of
303. E.g., Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr.
754 (1963).
304. RESTATEMENT (ScoNND) oF TORTS § 402A, comment j at 353 (1965). Therefore, the result of Barrett v. S.S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941),
wherein the plaintiff was denied recovery for injuries resulting from her peculiar

susceptibility to some unknown toxic element in a cotton dress would not be changed
by the advent of strict liability in tort.
305. Cf. Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
306. E.g., Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754
(1963) ; Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964).
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 402A, comment k at 353 (1965).
308. E.g., McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
309. Automobiles present a clear example of this distinction. The maker of an
automobile is not required to make his product as safe as possible in the event that
it may be involved in a collision. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th
Cir. 1966). But, if the standard of care imposed upon the manufacturer of "unavoidably dangerous" products were used, then the automobile manufacturer would have to
take all possible precautions to avoid the risk of injury resulting from a collision.
310. See pp. 845-47 infra for a discussion of the definition of seller.
311. R&STATEMENT (S4coND) or TORTS § 402A, comment g at 351 (1965).
61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
Published 312.
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Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co.,3 13 a California court of appeals applying

Vandermark found the manufacturer of a concrete cutting machine liable
for the faulty installation of a bushing by the retailer 314 which resulted in
an explosion causing the loss of the plaintiff's right eye. Although these
cases cast grave doubt on the efficacy of comment g in California, other
jurisdictions have applied it to reach different conclusions on similar facts.
In State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 315 the Supreme Court of Mississippi
held that the manufacturer would not be liable for damages which were
the result of the builder's failure to install a temperature relief valve in a
hot water heater as the manufacturer had instructed. The court noted
that there was "a substantial change in the condition in which the manufacturer sold it."'

I

On similar facts the Supreme Court of New Jersey

in Schipper v. Levitt 0" Sons3 17 denied the plaintiff's action against the
manufacturer of a hot water heater not solely because the defect originated
while in the hands of the builder, but also on the dubious theory that the
plaintiff already had one sufficiently solvent defendant.318
A central question arises from this conflict as to what effect directions-119 or instructions given by the manufacturer will have on his liability.
In order to resolve this question it is essential to indicate at the outset that
the parties involved are the retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers.
There would seemingly be no reason to include the user or consumer of
the "do-it-yourself-kit" within the purview of the issue, of instructions,
since the manufacturer and retailer would seem to have a right to expect
that the user or consumer will follow the enclosed instructions. 2 ° In a
situation such as this, the manufacturer or retailer has no effective means
of controlling the conduct of the user or consumer, whereas in the manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer situation there is a degree of proximity which
could give rise to a duty on the part of the manufacturer to use all reasonable
means to insure that the wholesaler or retailer follows his instructions.3 21
If the policy which permeates the area of products liability is to protect
the user or consumer from potential hardships resulting from an injury
313. 230 Cal. App. 2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964).
314. The court in Alvarea stated: "Such [strict] liability extends to the manufacturer even though the defect was caused by a dealer or retailer who was not the agent
or employee of the manufacturer." Id. at 996-97, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
315. 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967). But see id.
at ----189 So. 2d at 125 (dissenting opinion).
316. Id. at 122.

317. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
318. Id. at 98, 207 A.2d at 329. See pp. 841-42 infra for a discussion of this
aspect of strict liability.
319. See pp. 848-49 infra relating to misuse of the product of plaintiff's failure
to follow directions.
320. This does not necessarily preclude the manufacturer's liability for injuries
resulting from latent defects in the product or for giving the user inadequate instructions. This would be analogous to the approach which is taken to warnings. See
pp. 838-39 supra.

321. The Alvare and Vanderniark decisions seem to indicate that California will
follow this rationale, whereas the Hodges and Schipper cases indicate that Mississippi
and New Jersey will abide by the language of the Restatement and its comments.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
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caused by a dangerously defective product, 22 then the soundest approach
to the problem of instructions or delegation of the manufacturing process
is to require the plaintiff to prove only that he received the product in a
dangerously defective condition from someone in the economic chain. 32'
This approach is not new to Pennsylvania law, as it has been applied in
products liability cases involving the doctrine of exclusive control 324 and
the underlying policies which dictated the results in those cases are just
as applicable when the court is invoking 402A. Thus, parties in the economic chain should be considered jointly and severally liable 32' 5 for any

injuries which result from the placing of a dangerously defective product
on the market and they should be left to "adjust the costs of such protection
' 32
between them in the course of their continuing business relationship. "4
The liability of a seller of a defective product which will be substantially changed or processed by another is expressly left open by a caveat
-to section 402A. 327 The pivotal issue here is not whether the subsequent
processing will amount to a delegation of the manufacturing process, but
whether the subsequent processor will have the responsibility to detect
the defect before -it reaches the ultimate user or consumer. If this transfer
of responsibility is imposed, it would appear that the seller of the preprocessed product might reasonably expect the subsequent processor to find
the defect and either remedy the situation or notify the seller of its defective condition. What may be reasonably expected will necessarily depend
upon the product in question, the character of the subsequent processing,
the nature of. the defect, the degree of danger, and the relationship between the parties.32 8 These considerations are by no means exclusive, and
others will appear as cases are decided by the courts. Nevertheless, there
seems to be no reason why the manufacturer of the defective material may
not be joined in the action by the plaintiff.32 9 This approach would be
consistent with the proposition. that the parties in the economic chain are
liable to..the plaintiff both jointly and severally, and that it is best left to
those parties to determine which one of them should properly shoulder
the burden of any judgment which is rendered.
Another. problem area which creates peculiar difficulties similar to
those of the substantially changed product concerns the role of the component part supplier. In the case of Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument
Co. 33 0 the New York court of appeals was faced with this issue and decided
322. See pp. 836-38 supra.
323. The defendants should then have a cause of action to be indemnified for the
cost of any judgment as they had in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Il1. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
324. See pp. 810-11 supra.
325. But.see pp. 839-40 supra.
326. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 900 (1964).
327. RPSTrAT4MENT (SicoND) ov TORTS § 402A, caveat 2 at 348 (1965).
328. See Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS
L.J. 9, 23 (1966).
329. But see State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966);
Schipper
v. Levitt
& Sons,Charles
44 N.J.
70, 207
A.2dof Law
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(1965). Repository, 1968
Published
by Villanova
University
Widger
330.
12 N.Y.2d
432, 191 N.E.2d
81, School
240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963).

49

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1968], Art. 10
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

13

that "adequate protection is provided for the injured passengers of the
airplane by casting in liability the airplane manufacturer which put into
the market the completed aircraft, ' 1 3 1 thereby dismissing the action as to
the supplier of the defective altimeter. This disposition of the component
part supplier issue was also adopted by the New Jersey supreme court
in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons. " 2 However, in Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 33 3 the Supreme Court of Illinois found "no reason why Bendix [the
component part supplier] should not come within the rule of strict liability" 33 4 for injuries which resulted from the defective condition of the
brakes which they supplied to the manufacturer of a truck.
There is no apparent substantive reason why these courts have taken
different views of the problem of the component part supplier. At best,
resolution of this problem seems to hinge on the issue of the assembler's
solvency. Thus, there appears to have arisen a rule in some jurisdictions
limiting the plaintiff to one solvent defendant regardless of the fact that
the defect arose while in the hands of the component part manufacturer.
Only in the Schipper case was any mention made of the possible transfer
33 5
of responsibility to the assembler for his failure to detect the defect,
86
and this was premised on the assembler's failure to heed instructions
given him by the supplier. The shifting of the responsibility to the assembler should be the pivotal issue to be decided by the courts. And, again,
the plaintiff's recovery should not rest on which way this question is
resolved. The determination of this issue should only effect the respective
liability of the defendant assembler and defendant supplier of the com33 7
ponent part.
E.

Plaintiffs Under 402A

The ultimate disposition of the issue as to who can sue under section
402A will most probably be that "any human being who sustains injury
is a proper plaintiff."3 38 Thus far, recovery has been granted to the em3 40
ployee of a gratuitous bailee of a product, 339 the donee of a product
34 2
34
the employee of a lessor of a product, ' and an airline passenger.
331. Id. at 437. 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.

332. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). See p. 840 supra.
333. 32 Ill.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); accord, Putnam v. Erie City Mfg.
Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).

334. 32 Ill.
2d at 622, 210 N.E.2d at 188.

335. Schipper v.Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 98, 207 A.2d 314, 329 (1965).
336. See pp. 839-41 supra.
337. See pp. 839-41 supra.

338. Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and

Past Vandermark, 38 S.

CAL.

L. Riv. 30, 55 (1965).

339. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).

340. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).

341. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965).

342. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).

12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
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The Restatement extends coverage to the "ultimate user or consumer,"3 43 and expresses no opinion as to other injured persons. 344 The
comments define an ultimate consumer or user as anyone who is actively
using or consuming the product, or preparing the product for its use or
consumption, or enjoying the benefit of its use by another. 345 The injured
"bystander," i.e., one who has no relationship to the product, is left to his
own best efforts to persuade the courts that he has every reason to be
placed within the scope of protection afforded ultimate users or consumers.
The question of who is a user or consumer presents problems when
asked in relation to a fact situation such as that found in Loch v. Confair.3 4"
In that case a husband and wife were shopping in a self-service market.
The husband picked up a bottle from a shelf and before the purchase was
completed the bottle exploded, injuring his wife. Neither party was actually consuming or using the goods. It may be argued that since a sale
is not required under 402A, and under modern shopping practices such
actions are necessary to either consumption or use of goods, strict liability
in tort should be a ground for redress for such injuries. This argument
is buttressed by the expansive definition of user or consumer in comment I
of section 402A.
If, however, the facts are changed slightly, a contrary result may be
reached. If the injured party were simply a person who happened to be
standing in the aisle close enough to be injured by the explosion, recovery
may be denied on the theory that the injured party was not a user or consumer but a bystander. This argument is tenable because liability under
402A is apparently based on the injured party's relationship, although not
contractual, to the defective product or its purchaser. For example, in
Webb v. Zern347 the plaintiff was the son of the purchaser of a beer keg
that exploded and injured him. In the hypothetical situation, however,
even assuming that the person picking up the bottle is a consumer, the
injured party still is in no way related to the product or the purchaser.
Whether the party in the hypothetical will recover depends on whether
courts will allow bystanders to recover. Three cases have been found in
which the bystander has been allowed to sue under 402A.3 48 The only
limitation these cases place on the liability of parties in the distributive
chain arises when the "factual position of the suing plaintiff is so far
causally removed as to render the defect a remote cause of his injury or
damage. . . -349 This approach appears to be coextensive with the alloca343. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)

oF TORTS

§ 402A

(1965).

344. Id., caveat 1 at 354. See also Note, Strict Products Liability and the
Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 916 (1964).
345. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) o TORTS, comment 1 at 354 (1965).
346. 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
347. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
348. Trojan Boat Co. v. Lutz, 358 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Mitchell v. Miller,
26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965) ; Piercefield v. Remington Arms
Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
349. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 99, 133 N.W.2d 129, 135
(1965).

See James, General Products -
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tion of cost theory. However, if a court adopts the misrepresentation theory
of recovery as the underlying rationale of strict liability in tort a contrary
result should be reached because the misrepresentation concept has only
been expressed in terms of the user or consumer and not in terms of the
general public. Most of the courts at this time have presented both policies
as the reasons for adopting section 402A, and unless the misrepresentation
theory is expanded to the general public, then a decision as to which policy
is more persuasive will dictate the disposition of the bystander problem.350
Also to be considered within the realm of the bystander problem is
the situation where an employee, who is either assembling component parts
or processing supplied materials, is injured as a result of the dangerously
defective condition of the supplied part or material. Here, the employee
is using the article but he is not the "ultimate user or consumer ' 3 '5 in the
sense of being, for example, a purchaser. Therefore, he would appear not
to be within the current scope of 402A protection. Recovery by the employee may turn on whether coverage is granted to the bystander.
There is no real reason why the bystander should not be accorded the
right to expect that he will not be injured by a dangerously defective
product. The policies underlying strict liability in tort present cogent
arguments and considerations for permitting the bystander to recover.31 2
He will suffer the same disproportionate amount of hardship from his injuries as the user or consumer and he should be granted the Same protection
from dangerously defective products.
Another problem is whether a repairman who, while servicing a
product, is injured as a result of its defective condition may sue under
402A. Comment I includes within the definition of user anyone "who' [is]
utilizing it [a product] for the purpose of doing-work upon it. ' ' 353

This

group of potential plaintiffs should present problems due to their peculiar
relationship to the product. The repairman normally will receive the
product only when it is functioning improperly and he will necessarily
inspect 3 5 4 the product to locate the cause of the malfunction. Also, he will

have more extensive knowledge of the cause of the malfunction and the
potential dangers involved. With this expertise and notice, he will be more
susceptible than the average user or consumer to proof of actual knowledge of the defect and of the degree of danger involved. 3" However, if he
received the product only for the purpose of a general inspection, and if
350. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9,
32-33 (1966).
351. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) o' TORTS § 402A(1) (1965) (emphasis added).
352. E.g., Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
(1965).
353. R8STATEMFNT (SEcoND) Op TORTS § 402A, comment I at 354 (1965). See
Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968).
354. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), liability was predicated partly on the assumption that the manufacturer could not expect the user to inspect the product. However, in the repairman
situation he has every reason to expect that the user will inspect the product before

using it.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/10
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the injury resulted from a defect which he had no reason to anticipate,
there would be no basis to distinguish his position from that of the
ordinary user or consumer.
F.

Defendants Under 402A

Generally, anyone in the economic chain is subject to strict liability
in tort under section 402A. Those who have been held liable under 402A
include manufacturers, 356 wholesalers, 357 retailers, 58 component part sup36 1
gratuitous bailors36 2
pliers, 359 builder-developers, 360 bailors for hire,

and assemblers.3 63 The only apparent qualification which has been placed
on the possible number of defendants is the dubious practice of limiting
the plaintiff to one solvent defendant and dismissing other possible de364
fendants as being unnecessary for the protection of the injured plaintiff.
On the other side of the coin is the case of Connor v. Conejo Valley
Dev. Co. 365 where the court posed this question in dictum:

Since we recognize the obligation of the manufacturer who has
the capacity to launch numerous potentially hazardous products on
the market, should we not be prepared to impose similar standards of
responsibility on the experienced and knowledgable home-lending institution when it financially launches an untried developer by assisting
him to produce and sell residential units to the uninformed public?N66
Although the court in Connor posed this question with regard to financiers
of real estate developments, the question may be valid in situations where
manufacturers or distributors, for example, obtain the requisite funds for
their operations from lending institutions. In light of the practice of financing institutions to thoroughly investigate the intended use of the funds
that they loan, as well as their own knowledge and expertise of commercial
and business affairs, should such financiers be held liable for defectively
made products on the theory that they are in direct relationship with the
manufacturer? This relationship would not be vertical, that is, ascending
up the distributive chain from the consumer to the manufacturer, but
rather horizontal, that is, a lending institution would be considered as
356. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
357. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965).
358. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
359. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
360. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
361. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
362. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
363. Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
364. E.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) ; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965);
see pp. 839-42 supra.
365. 253 Cal. App. 2d 186, 61 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1967).
366. byId.
at 205, University
61 Cal. Rptr.
at 346
(emphasis
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one with the manufacturer and the institution would thus assume the
same responsibility as the manufacturer to a party injured by a defective
product. a67 In this age of credit buying, it is hard to conceive of any
product which at some point was not affected by a party other than those
in the vertical chain of manufacture and distribution. The Connor case
cannot be said to have started a trend in the field of products liability but
it may be valuable in a case where there is difficulty in finding a defendant
capable of sustaining the costs of judgment. However, it must also be
pointed out that the solvency of one party should not be the criteria for
368
the potential liability of another party.
It is clear that a defendant's liability does not depend on his actual
possession of the goods before they reach the user or consumer. In Canifax
v. Hercules Powder Co.,369 a wholesaler of dynamite who ordered the goods
from the manufacturer who in turn shipped the goods directly to the
user was held strictly liable in tort. In Canifax the issue of whether the
defendant had exercised due care by inspecting the goods before the sale
was of no significance as to his liability as a seller.370 Therefore, the focal
point of liability for dangerously defective conditions in the product is the
economic chain, and the physical chain which the product has followed
will have little or no significance. However, this is not to discount the
possibility that in the process of shipping the product it might have been
mishandled, creating a dangerous condition which caused plaintiff's injury.
If this situation arises it should be left to the parties in the economic chain
to determine who is responsible for the mishandling of the product.
Expressly excluded from liability under 402A is the occasional
seller 3 71 - one who sells his car to a neighbor or who trades his product
as part of the consideration for the purchase of another product, and
innumerable comparable situations.37 2 In these types of transactions the
policy of protecting the consumer and of allocating the costs of injuries
would have no apparent application. The occasional seller is usually as
incapable of withstanding such a loss as the injured user and would
normally have no greater ability to detect and remedy the defect.
The seller of used chattels will most probably be another defendant
who will find himself within the purview of section 402AY37 There is no
reason to differentiate him from other retailers, and the only aspect of a
case brought against him which will be peculiar to his trade is the element
of wear and tear which is characteristic of used chattels. The effect of
367. This is similar to the vertical and horizontal privity discussed at pp. 825-28
supra, except that the horizontal relationship relates to the economic chain and not to
the consumer.
368. Putman v. Erie Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
369. 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
370. But see Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968), where
in dictum the Pennsylvania supreme court predicated the liability of the wholesaler
on section 400 of the Restatement. See p. 804 supra.
371. RxSTATMZNT (StcoND) or ToRTs § 402A, comment f at 350-51 (1965).
372. Id. at 351.
373. See Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to
and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 30, 57-58 (1965).
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this element of wear and tear will be to create a more difficult burden
upon the plaintiff to prove that the defect resulted from the manufacturing
of the product, and not from the wear and tear.
G. Damages
In a strict liability case, a plaintiff may recover for all personal injuries
proximately resulting from the dangerously defective condition of the
37
product.3 74 Recovery has also been granted for damages to the product
37
and damages to other property owned by the plaintiff. 6
A most perplexing problem is whether a plaintiff may recover for
economic losses. There is a split on this issue and at present Pennsylvania
has not taken a definite stand. In Seely v. White Motor Co., 377 the California supreme court when confronted with this issue stated:
The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the economic
relations between the suppliers and consumers of goods. The history
of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed,
not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of the
Uniform Commercial
Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem
378
of physical injuries.
However, the New Jersey supreme court took a different view of the situation in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,379 and posited:
The range of its operation [strict liability in tort] must be developed
as the problems arise and by courts mindful that the public interest
demands consumer protection. And, in this connection, obviously
one measure of the nature of the manufacturer's obligation necessarily
must be the price at which the380
manufacturer reasonably contemplated
that the article might be sold.
As a matter of policy, the conflict appears to be between the desire to
protect the consumer from defective products when he has no adequate
means of protecting himself and the overstepping of judicial power by
disregarding a legislative mandate in the form of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 38 1 Dean Prosser resolves this conflict in favor of a warranty action,
premising his position on the expectations of the seller and buyer as the
382
key considerations in determining whether any loss has been sustained.
An action for loss of bargain necessarily sounds in contract and not in
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

See, e.g., Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
E.g., Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966).
63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
Id. at 67, 207 A.2d at 313.

381. Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the

Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 692,
713 (1965).
382. See Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HAsTINGs
L.J. 9, 35 (1966).
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strict liability in tort. Also, the manufacturer is the supplier of the goods
and has no adequate means of policing what bargain the parties may strike.
One indication of what Pennsylvania's position will be on this issue
is the remark of Justice Jones in his concurring-dissenting opinion in
Miller v. Preitz.
I believe that Section 402a (sic)

. . . furnishes the appropriate

vehicle for the recovery of damages for injuries to the person or
property arising from defective products while actions for the recovery
should
of damages for "economic loss" arising from defective3 8products
3
be maintained under the Uniform Commercial Code.
Moreover, this result is also signalled by the decision in Atlas Aluminum
Corp. v. Borden Chem. Co.,38 4 where recovery for lost profits was denied

in a suit against the manufacturer of adhesives for property and commercial losses resulting from the adhesives' failure to hold glass placed in
window frames made by the plaintiff.
The weight of the argument to grant recovery for economic losses
under 402A must not be overlooked, since the policies underlying strict
liability are as applicable to economic loss as to physical injury. In
applying the allocation theory of strict liability in tort it must be noted
that the financial hardship inuring to the plaintiff in an economic loss
situation may be just as overwhelming as that which would result from
a physical injury.
H. Defenses
Neither privity, nor failure to give notice, nor contributory negligence,
38 5
nor disclaimer is a defense to an action based on strict liability in tort.
Privity is expressly disavowed by the language of 402A. Notice is not required, as it is in warranty actions, because the liability is not imposed on
the basis of breach of an implied condition of a sales contract but is in tort
for breach of a duty imposed as a policy of the law. Contributory negligence is not a defense since the liability of the defendant is not predicated
on fault, but is strict regardless of the exercise of due care. The liability
of the parties in the economic chain cannot be disclaimed by agreement
since liability is based on tort rather than contract principles.
The defendant does, however, have a right to expect that the user or
consumer will use his product in the manner in which it was intended.3 8,
It is not clear whether improper use of the product is a defense which
the defendant must raise and bear the burden of proving, or whether
it is part of the plaintiff's case to prove that he was using the product
383. 422 Pa. 383, 410-11, 221 A.2d 320, 335 (1966) (concurring-dissenting opinion).
384. 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
385. RESTATEMENT (SUcOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment vi at 356 (1965).
386. Sce Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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in the way intended when the mishap occurred.387 Although Pennsylvania has not as yet ruled on this point, the most tactically advantageous
approach for the defendant's attorney might be to present evidence of
plaintiff's misuse of the product on the issues of defect or causation, and
thereby avoid the burden of proof on the issue which would result from
raising misuse as an affirmative defense to the action. 38 8 This approach
is buttressed by the argument that the plaintiff has more facts available
to him as to how he was using the product at the time of the accident than
does the remote manufacturer. On this basis, there is good reason to make
this a part of the plaintiff's case and to impose on him the burden of proof.
With respect to the defense of assumption of risk, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania stated in. dictum in Ferrarov. Ford Motor Co., 3 8 9 "that

if the buyer, knows of the defect and voluntarily and unreasonably proceeds to use the product or encounter a known danger, this should preclude
recovery and constitute a complete defense to the action even in cases of
strict liability." 390 Apparently this position is a countervailing consideration or policy based on the theory that although a manufacturer by placing
goods on the market impliedly represents that they are safe, there can be
no misrepresentation where a party voluntarily and unreasonably disregards a known danger. Before the user is precluded from recovery for
his injuries, however, 'it
must be shown that the user had actual knowledge
of the defect. Proof that he negligently failed to discover the defect is
insufficient. 391 Furthermore, as was pointed out in Ferraro,the mere fact
that he knew of the defect and voluntarily used the product will not establish the defense; it must also be proven that his actions were unreasonable.
Finally, the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations may be
available to defendants in an action based on strict liability. In Pennsylvania three different statutes of limitations may be applicable depending
on whether redress is sought for personal injuries, property damages, or
wrongful death. The statute of limitations for personal injuries begins to
run at the time of injury for a period of 2 years.392 In the case of property damages the statutory period is 6 years after the damages are incurred. 393 Wrongful death actions must be brought within 1 year after
death. 394 The above mentioned statutes of limitations, and not the statute
of limitations of the Uniform Commercial Code, ' 91 5 will apply to strict
liability actions since actions under 402A are trespass actions.'9 0
387. See Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 793, 50 Cal. Rptr.
143 (1966).
388. See Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964).
389. 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966).
390. Id. at 327, 223 A.2d at 748.
391. Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 329, 223 A.2d 746, 749 (1966);
RESTATEMENT (SscoNI)
op TORTS § 402A, comment it at 356 (1965).
392. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
393. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953).
394. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1603 (1953).
395.
PA. STAT.University
ANN. tit.
12A, §Widger
2-725 School
(Supp.of1967).
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CONCLUSION

In light of the increasingly liberal means of obtaining redress for injuries resulting from defective products now afforded parties under the
theories of negligence, warranty, and strict liability in tort, legislation in
the area of products liability may well be the next step in the development
of this field of law. Such legislation may fashion a plan similar to Workmen's Compensation. If such a procedure were enacted, in order to recover
an injured party would be required to prove only that his personal injury
or property damage was caused by a defective product. Under such a
"Consumer Compensation" plan, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers
would contribute to a common fund from which payments to compensate
for defective product-caused injuries would be made. The cost of such
contributions would then be allocable to the consuming public, together
with other overhead costs of producing goods. Such a program would
greatly economize the time of the courts and provide an efficient means
for injured consumers to obtain compensation.
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